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ESSAY
THE ORIGINS OF SUPREME COURT QUESTION
SELECTION
Benjamin B. Johnson*
Arbitrary control over its own docket is the hallmark of the modern
Supreme Court. While the Court’s power to choose its cases is a frequent
subject of study, its practice of preselecting questions for review has received almost no attention. This is particularly surprising since the
Court openly adds or subtracts questions in some of its most consequential
and politicizing cases. Yet despite the signiﬁcance of this practice, its origins are poorly understood. This Essay uncovers the hidden history of the
Court’s question-selection powers and reveals an important—and possibly intractable—conﬂict between the Court’s legal authority and its practice.
Scholars usually explain the Court’s agenda control as either a
power granted by Congress or a natural component of the judicial power.
Tracing the statutory, legislative, and common law histories, this Essay
presents a novel challenge to these standard narratives. The Court’s custom of targeting speciﬁc questions is not grounded in the history of appellate practice and Congress never intended to, and likely never did, give
the Supreme Court the power to select its own questions. This history has
profound repercussions for the Court’s appellate jurisdiction. The
question-selection power rests uneasily with both statutory law and
Article III’s “case or controversy” requirement, risks doing fundamental
injustice to litigants, and pulls the Court deeper into politics—all of
which put its legitimacy at risk. Abandoning this practice would almost
certainly limit the Court’s ability to answer hot-button political questions,
but it might also help to preserve the Court’s legitimacy.
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INTRODUCTION
Congress’s decision to give the Supreme Court vast power to select
cases remains one of the most consequential decisions of the twentieth
century. That power—implemented through the writ of certiorari—allows
the Court to dodge cases it does not want to decide. Not only is certiorari
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the primary way the Court exercises the famous passive virtues,1 it was a
necessary precondition for the expansion of individual, constitutional
rights.2 But the Court does not simply use certiorari to choose its cases; it
also uses the writ to select its questions.3 Indeed, it is far more accurate to
say the Court takes and decides questions than to say it picks and judges
cases.
The Court most obviously exercises its question-selection power by
adding questions to or subtracting them from a case. For example, when
the Court extended First Amendment protections to corporations’ political speech in Citizens United, it did so by adding its own question that nobody had asked.4 By contrast, in Shapiro v. Thompson, the Court simply
ignored the question of whether the Eleventh Amendment barred retroactive relief and affirmed the judgment below ordering payment.5 When
the Court examined the question ﬁve years later in Edelman v. Jordan, it
1. See generally Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term—Foreword:
The Passive Virtues, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 40 (1961) (discussing various doctrines used by the
Court to withhold constitutional adjudication).
2. Before the Court received certiorari power, it was required to hear and decide any
case in which an individual claimed a state violated their constitutional rights. It is difficult
to imagine that the Court would have incorporated the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth
Amendments if every state criminal conviction or sentence challenged on those grounds
would come before the Court for mandatory review. See Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning
Certiorari: Some Reﬂections Seventy-Five Years After the Judges’ Bill, 100 Colum. L. Rev.
1643, 1732 (2000); see also infra section II.C.
3. To my knowledge, only one paper focuses on the phenomenon of limited grants
of certiorari to particular questions. See Scott H. Bice, The Limited Grant of Certiorari and
the Justiﬁcation of Judicial Review, 1975 Wis. L. Rev. 343, 344. Other scholars have recognized the phenomenon in passing while considering other aspects of the Court’s agendasetting. See Hartnett, supra note 2, at 1707; see also H.W. Perry, Jr., Deciding to Decide:
Agenda Setting in the United States Supreme Court 221 (1991) (noting that Justices and
clerks “used ‘case’ and ‘issue’ interchangeably” and that “it is the issue, not the case that is
primary”).
4. Concurring in part in Citizens United, Justice John Paul Stevens stated:
[T]he majority decides this case on a basis relinquished below, not included in the questions presented to us by the litigants, and argued here
only in response to the Court’s invitation. . . . Our colleagues’ suggestion
that “we are asked to reconsider Austin and, in effect, McConnell,” . . .
would be more accurate if rephrased to state that “we have asked ourselves” to reconsider those cases.
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 396 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring
in part) (citation omitted).
5. See 394 U.S. 618, 642 (1969) (affirming the lower court judgments without any
mention of the Eleventh Amendment); Jurisdictional Statement at *8, Shapiro, 394 U.S. 618
(No. 9), 1967 WL 129526 (raising the question, “In View of the 11th Amendment, May the
Court Award Money Damages?”). The Court summarily affirmed similar judgments in several other cases, including Sterrett v. Mothers & Childs. Rts. Org., 409 U.S. 809, 809 (1972)
(mem.); State Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Zarate, 407 U.S. 918, 918 (1972) (mem.);
Wyman v. Bowens, 397 U.S. 49, 49 (1970) (mem.) (per curiam) (citing Shapiro). These summary affirmances were judgments on the merits and thus represented binding precedent
on the included questions. See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344 (1975).
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had to sheepishly admit that it had fouled up earlier cases because it had
not been paying attention to all of the questions included in the case.6
These cases are striking because the question-targeting decision directly
affected prominent constitutional holdings, but the practice is extensive
and present in many landmark cases, like Carolene Products,7 Gideon v.
Wainwright,8 and Furman v. Georgia,9 as well as in recent cases dealing with
same-sex marriage,10 class certiﬁcation,11 recess-appointments,12 the recognition of Jerusalem as a part of Israel,13 and whether the Deferred Action
6. 415 U.S. 651, 670–71 (1974) (noting that the Shapiro opinion “did not . . . refer to
or substantively treat the Eleventh Amendment argument” and, after “an opportunity to
more fully consider the Eleventh Amendment issue after brieﬁng and argument,” the Court
disapproved of the Eleventh Amendment holdings of Shapiro and three cases decided on
summary judgment).
7. See Carolene Prods. Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 760, 760 (1944) (mem.). The
Court’s order dropped the following questions: (1) “Did the Government establish liability
on the part of the individual petitioners?”; and (2) “Did the Government violate the individual petitioners’ constitutional rights in calling them as witnesses against themselves?” See
id.; Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, Carolene Prods., 321 U.S. 760 (No. 674-21).
8. See Gideon v. Cochran, 370 U.S. 908, 908 (1962) (mem.), cert. granted sub nom.
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 338 (1963) (adding the question, “Should this Court’s
holding in Betts v. Brady be reconsidered?” (citation omitted)).
9. The Court’s order added the question: “Does the imposition and carrying out of
the death penalty in this case constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments?” See 403 U.S. 952, 952 (1971) (mem.). The Court’s
order dropped the following questions: (1) “Whether a prospective juror was improperly
excluded from petitioner’s jury in violation of the rule of Witherspoon v. Illinois?”; (2)
“Whether Georgia’s practice of allowing capital trial juries absolute discretion to impose the
death penalty, uncontrolled by standards or directions of any kind, violates the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?”; and (3) “Whether punishment of death by electrocution pursuant to provisions of Georgia law for the crime of murder constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments?” See id.;
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Furman, 408 U.S. 238 (No. 5059).
10. In Hollingsworth v. Perry, 568 U.S. 1066, 1066 (2012) (mem.), the Court’s order
added the question: “Whether petitioners have standing under Article III, § 2 of the
Constitution in this case.” In United States v. Windsor, 568 U.S. 1066, 1066 (2012) (mem.),
the Court’s order added the following questions: (1) “Whether the executive branch’s
agreement with the court below that DOMA is unconstitutional deprives this court of
jurisdiction to decide this case”; and (2) “[W]hether the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group
of the United States House of Representatives has Article III standing in this case.”
11. The Court’s order in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 562 U.S. 1091, 1091 (2010)
(mem.), dropped the question: “Whether the certiﬁcation order conforms to the requirements of Title VII, the Due Process Clause, the Seventh Amendment, the Rules Enabling
Act, and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23,” and added the question: “Whether the class
certiﬁcation ordered under Rule 23(b)(2) was consistent with Rule 23(a).” See id.; Petition
for Writ of Certiorari at *2, Wal-Mart Stores, 562 U.S. 1091 (2010) (No. 10-277), 2010 U.S. S.
Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2028.
12. In Nat’l Lab. Rels. Bd. v. Noel Canning, 570 U.S. 916, 916 (2013) (mem.), the
Court’s order added the question: “Whether the President’s recess-appointment power may
be exercised when the Senate is convening every three days in pro forma sessions.”
13. In M.B.Z. ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 563 U.S. 973, 973 (2011) (mem.), the Court
added the question: “Whether Section 214 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act,
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for Parents of Americans (DAPA) program violated the Take Care
Clause,14 among others.15
Even when the Court does not narrow or add questions explicitly, it is
still only considering questions. Its rules are quite clear on this point:
“Only the questions set out in the petition, or fairly included therein, will
be considered by the Court.”16 From where did this question-selection
power come?
One potential answer is the Article III judicial power itself. That is,
perhaps the power to limit review to prespeciﬁed questions is incidental to
the Court’s appellate powers over cases and controversies generally or the
common law writ of certiorari in particular.17 A second answer would stress
Congress’s Article III power over the Court’s appellate jurisdiction. This
approach would locate the source of the power in a series of statutes that
expanded the Court’s statutory certiorari jurisdiction in response to an
overcrowded Supreme Court docket. Neither of these answers is entirely
persuasive in light of the history uncovered below.
The former explanation struggles to deal with the relevant procedural
and intellectual history. Originally, the Court exercised its appellate jurisdiction through two common law devices: the writ of error and the appeal.18 Neither device allowed Justices to limit review to preselected
questions. The main difference between them was that appeals required
review of facts as well as law.19 Review on either method was mandatory (the
Court was required to review the case if the petitioner satisﬁed procedural
requirements), limited to the record, and comprehensive (Justices had to review the entire record).20

Fiscal Year 2003, impermissibly infringes the President’s power to recognize foreign sovereigns.”
14. In United States v. Texas, 577 U.S. 1101, 1101 (2016) (mem.), the Court added the
question: “Whether the Guidance violates the Take Care Clause of the Constitution, Art. II,
§ 3.”
15. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Step Zero After City of Arlington, 83 Fordham L. Rev.
753, 769–75 (2014) (describing how the Court decided only the “meta-question” in the case
and relied on “drive-by” precedents where the cases providing authority had not actually
discussed the relevant question).
16. Sup. Ct. R. 14.1(a).
17. See, e.g., Philip Hamburger, The Development of the Law of Seditious Libel and
the Control of the Press, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 661, 729 n.206 (1985) (noting the historical use of
certiorari to investigate jurisdictional issues).
18. For an overview of appellate practice in the Founding Era, see Nicholas R. Parrillo,
A Critical Assessment of the Originalist Case Against Administrative Regulatory Power: New
Evidence From the Federal Tax on Private Real Estate in the 1790s, 130 Yale L.J. 1288, 1417–
29 (2021) [hereinafter Parrillo, Originalist Case Against Administrative Regulatory Power].
19. See infra section II.D.
20. See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) (observing how
review is mandatory if jurisdiction exists).
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Nor can the common law writ of certiorari provide historical support.
The Court did not use the common law writ to take a case until the late
nineteenth century.21 And when it eventually did begin to use the writ, it
took the case and then proceeded as if acting on a writ of error or appeal.22
The judicial power explanation also runs aground upon Chief Justice
John Marshall’s famed statement in Cohens v. Virginia: “[W]ith whatever
difficulties, a case may be attended, we must decide it . . . . [The Court has]
no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than
to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to
the constitution.”23 Marshall’s next lines are particularly relevant: “Questions may occur which we would gladly avoid; but we cannot avoid them.
All we can do is, to exercise our best judgment, and conscientiously to perform our duty.”24
This makes it difficult to understand question-selection as a lesser included power of case selection. Per Chief Justice Marshall, the power to
answer questions is not a lesser power than deciding questions.25 Rather,
the ability to authoritatively answer questions is derivative of the obligation
to render judgment in a case.26 It follows then that, if the Court is not deciding a case, it lacks the power to answer questions. Thus, even if certiorari gives the Court power to choose which cases to decide, it is the
deciding of the case that provides the power to answer a question, not certiorari discretion itself.
The second possible explanation is that Congress exercised its Article
III power over the Court’s appellate jurisdiction to empower the Court to
target particular questions, not just select cases. It is true that Congress
empowered the Court with certiorari powers through the Evarts Act in
1891.27 Still, Congress explicitly linked certiorari to the appeal and writ of
error by requiring that, once the Court granted certiorari, it must then
proceed “with the same power and authority in the case as if it had been
carried by appeal or writ of error to the Supreme Court.”28 Writing about
this newly created certiorari power, the Court averred that, “[f]rom the

21. See infra section III.B.
22. See infra section III.B.
23. Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 404.
24. Id. It also seems incongruent with the classic justiﬁcation of judicial review. Traditionally, the Court’s power “to say what the law is” is derivative of its obligation to decide
cases. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176–77 (1803); see also Bickel, supra note
1, at 42–43; Hartnett, supra note 2, at 1714–15. For a book-length examination of judicial
duty with particular attention to Marbury, see generally Philip Hamburger, Law and Judicial
Duty (2008) [hereinafter Hamburger, Law and Judicial Duty].
25. See Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 404; Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 178; Bickel,
supra note 1, at 42; Hartnett, supra note 2, at 1713–17.
26. See Bickel, supra note 1, at 42; Hartnett, supra note 2, at 1713–17.
27. Judiciary Act of 1891, Pub. L. No. 51-517, § 6, 26 Stat. 826, 828.
28. Id.

2022]

SUPREME COURT QUESTION SELECTION

799

very foundation of our judicial system the object and policy of the acts of
Congress in relation to appeals and writs of error . . . [has] been . . . to
have the whole case and every matter in controversy in it decided in a single appeal”29 and further noted that “a case cannot be brought to this
court in fragments.”30
The Evarts Act also gave circuit courts the ability to certify individual
questions of law to the Supreme Court31—just as federal courts certify
questions of state law to state supreme courts.32 Thus, Congress explicitly
provided for review of questions but not through certiorari. It linked review of questions to certiﬁcation. In contrast, it tied certiorari to cases.33
If question selection did not arise through statute or common law tradition, where did it come from? In 1925, Congress greatly expanded the
Court’s certiorari jurisdiction through the Judges’ Bill.34 Testifying in favor
of the bill, the Justices repeatedly promised that certiorari review encompassed the entire case.35 Despite their promises, the Justices, on their own
initiative, soon eradicated the traditional strictures on appellate review.36

29. McLish v. Roff, 141 U.S. 661, 665–66 (1891).
30. Id. at 665.
31. Judiciary Act of 1891 § 6, 26 Stat. at 828.
32. See Jonathan Remy Nash, Examining the Power of Federal Courts to Certify Questions of State Law, 88 Cornell L. Rev. 1672, 1674 (2003) (discussing how most state high
courts offer federal courts the opportunity to “certify” those questions to the state high
court).
33. Id. Indeed, the legislative history suggests Congress intended certiorari to be
merely a backup power in case the circuit courts were negligent in certifying questions, but
that power was to be exercised by bringing the entire case up for review. See Hartnett, supra
note 2, at 1656; see also Peter Linzer, The Meaning of Certiorari Denials, 79 Colum. L. Rev.
1227, 1235–36 (1979) (“[Evarts’s] remarks make clear that the draftsmen of the 1891 Act
intended the speciﬁc reference to certiorari not to create a totally new statutory form of
discretionary appeal but simply to serve as a safety valve . . . .”).
34. See Judiciary Act of 1925 (Judges’ Bill of 1925), Pub. L. No. 68-415, § 240(a), 43
Stat. 936, 938–39 (providing for allowance of certiorari to courts of appeals on petition of
either party).
35. See infra section IV.A.
36. See infra section IV.B. This stands in stark contrast to the modern Court’s careful
adherence to limiting remedies to historical analogues. See Judith Resnik, Constricting
Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and Federal Power, 78 Ind. L.J. 223, 234–36
(2003) (discussing the Court’s conclusion in Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. All.
Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 333 (1999), that, “because the remedy would not ‘historically’ have been available from a court of equity, the district court had no power to prevent
the disposition of assets pending adjudication”).
The doctrine of constitutional avoidance is also relevant here. See Ashwander v. Tenn.
Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“When the validity of an
act of the Congress is drawn in question . . . it is a cardinal principle that this Court will ﬁrst
ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may
be avoided.” (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932))). What is commonly
thought to be a doctrine that restrains the Court from overreach is often instead a tool for
judicial lawmaking. See Neal Kumar Katyal & Thomas P. Schmidt, Active Avoidance: The
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First, they abandoned comprehensive review of the record in favor of limited review of the questions speciﬁed by the parties.37 Later, they began to
write their own questions, even questions nobody had asked or questions
that were no longer part of the case.38 Today, the limited and comprehensive review mandated by Congress—and promised by the Justices when
they lobbied for expanded discretion39—is no more. While the statute still
says that the Court should review cases on certiorari, by rule, the Court
only considers a preselected subset of questions.40
The Evarts Act, the Judges’ Bill, and several other legislative efforts to
expand the scope of certiorari emerged when the Court was overburdened
and unable to keep up with its work.41 Two things are notable. First, in
every instance, Congress expanded the Court’s certiorari jurisdiction but
maintained the clear textual distinction between certiﬁcation and certiorari, linking questions to the former and cases to the latter.42 Second, the
point of expanding certiorari was to reduce the number of cases the Court
was required to decide.43 Certiorari at common law removed entire cases
Modern Supreme Court and Legal Change, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 2109, 2118–23 (2015) (suggesting the Court uses avoidance as an excuse to radically reinterpret statutes).
37. See infra section IV.B.
38. See infra section IV.C; see also Margaret L. Moses, Beyond Judicial Activism: When
the Supreme Court Is No Longer a Court, 14 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 161, 162 (2011) (examining
cases in which the Court “decided issues that were not based on a record below, had not
been the subject of decisions by lower courts, and sometimes had not even been briefed by
parties or amici”). Cases Professor Margaret Moses identiﬁed include Citizens United v. Fed.
Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009),
Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778 (2009), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). See
Moses, supra, at 174–75.
39. See infra section IV.A.
40. Sup. Ct. R. 14.1(a). The Court is careful to avoid the “tempt[ation]” to decide
questions that are relevant to cases but not included in the petition. See Izumi Seimitsu
Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips Corp., 510 U.S. 27, 34 (1993) (per curiam) (“Our
faithful application of Rule 14.1(a) thus helps ensure that we are not tempted to engage in
ill-considered decisions of questions not presented in the petition.”).
41. One of the best contemporary discussions regarding the changing workload of the
Court during this period is in Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Business of the
Supreme Court: A Study in the Federal Judicial System (1928) [hereinafter Frankfurter &
Landis, Business of the Supreme Court: A Study]. Additional contemporary accounts can
be found in H.R. Rep. No. 50-942, at 3–4 (1888) (noting that the Supreme Court was over
three years behind on its docket and supporting a measure to narrow its jurisdiction), and
in many of the writings and speeches of William Howard Taft in the 1920s. See, e.g., William
H. Taft, The Attacks on the Courts and Legal Procedure, Ky. L.J., Oct. 1916, at 3, 18 (arguing
that narrowing the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction would facilitate the quicker resolution of
cases); see also Justin Crowe, Building the Judiciary: Law, Courts, and the Politics of Institutional Development 201–03 (2012) (recounting the preeminent role Taft played in advocating for reforms to the federal judiciary, including granting the Supreme Court greater
control over its docket); Hartnett, supra note 2, at 1664–66 (surveying Taft’s arguments for
expanding the Supreme Court’s ability to choose the cases that it hears).
42. See 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (2018).
43. See Crowe, supra note 41, at 185–87.
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for ordinary review. If the Court could satisfy its appellate obligations by
reviewing only a subset of questions—especially a subset chosen by the Justices—then there would be no need to slog through all of those cases in
such detail and thus no need for the backlogs in the ﬁrst place. The Court
never had the power to cherry-pick questions, and Congress’s grant of certiorari discretion was not designed to give it such power.
This state of affairs is no mere academic concern.44 The modern
Court has effectively abandoned the traditional judicial role of deciding
cases in favor of targeting preselected questions.45 This arrangement may
serve the Court’s institutional interests,46 but it also pulls the Court into
politics.47 Professor Alexander Bickel’s defense of certiorari as a way to
avoid contested cases is thus inverted; the Supreme Court now uses certiorari to directly engage with the most contentious underlying issues.48
As a result, the Court now faces the very challenges to its legitimacy
and standing in our political process that Bickel feared. Leading law reviews warn of “grave threat[s] to the Court’s legitimacy” in the wake of
“seismic” shifts at the Court.49 Leading academics and a former Attorney

44. See Jane S. Schacter, Judicial Capacities, 2020 Wis. L. Rev. 283, 285 (“[The] ability
to act selectively is itself an important form of power, and one that animates many critiques
of the Court.”).
45. See Hartnett, supra note 2, at 1707 (noting that, “under current Supreme Court
practice, all writs of certiorari are limited writs: None brings forth all properly preserved
claims of error within the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction”).
46. As Professor Judith Resnik described the judiciary in a parallel context, the Court
is acting like “a principal, acting on its own behalf to forward particular agendas.” Resnik,
supra note 36, at 228. That analysis concerns implied rights and available remedies in the
judiciary as a whole, but the common thread is that the Court uses the pose of restraint—
limiting its remedies or inquiries—to advance the Justices’ preferred agenda.
47. See Schacter, supra note 44, at 288–89 (noting that “charges of ‘judicial supremacy’ . . . are in fact inspired and fueled precisely by the discretion the Court has to intervene
unevenly and to shape policy unpredictably”).
48. See Sanford Levinson, Comment on Ruben and Blocher: Too Damn Many Cases,
and an Absent Supreme Court, 68 Duke L.J. Online 17, 26 (2018) (“The current Court,
when it wishes to, can be quite aggressive indeed, as demonstrated in Shelby County, Sibelius
[sic], and Obergefell, to name only three obvious examples.”).
49. See Daniel Epps & Ganesh Sitaraman, How to Save the Supreme Court, 129 Yale
L.J. 148, 150–51 (2019). Scholarly treatments of legitimacy concerns are easy to ﬁnd. See
generally, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Law and Legitimacy in the Supreme Court (2018)
(examining the concept of legitimacy and concluding that the Supreme Court’s sociological
legitimacy is decreasing); Brian Christopher Jones, Disparaging the Supreme Court, Part II:
Questioning Institutional Legitimacy, 2016 Wis. L. Rev. 239 (remarking that a spate of controversial decisions has cast the Supreme Court’s legitimacy into doubt, thereby threatening
the future of judicial review); Christopher Sundby & Suzanna Sherry, Term Limits and Turmoil: Roe v. Wade’s Whiplash, 98 Tex. L. Rev. 121, 156–57 (2019) (using statistical modeling
to argue that term limits for Justices of the Supreme Court would be unlikely to increase
doctrinal stability). But see Stephen E. Sachs, Supreme Court as Superweapon: A Response
to Epps & Sitaraman, 129 Yale L.J. Forum 93, 95 (2019) (arguing that a Supreme Court that
seeks to appease both sides of public opinion is ultimately unable to remain above politics).
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General warn that the Court’s legitimacy is in question.50 Partisan reformers reach for both old ideas to curb the Court—term limits, court packing,
jurisdiction stripping51—and some ideas that require a “radical rethinking
of how the Court has operated for more than two centuries.”52
Before we abandon more than two hundred years of institution building, perhaps solving the puzzle of the Court’s question-selection power
could provide a way through the Court’s current legitimacy crisis. The following history and analysis strongly suggest that the Court would be on
ﬁrmer ground if it returned to a more traditional role of deciding entire
cases. This shift would likely curb the Justices’ role in setting national policy and hopefully de-escalate ﬁghts over the Court.
In raising these issues, this Essay joins a larger literature examining
the Court’s agenda-setting process. The importance of agenda-setting is
well-known in law53 and political science.54 Over the years, scholars have
attacked the Court’s certiorari process on a variety of grounds. Some critics
say the Court takes too few cases;55 some say it takes too many.56 Others say
the Court’s agenda-setting process is too beholden to the Supreme Court
bar,57 too dependent on clerks,58 or possibly gives the Chief Justice too
50. See Justin Wise, Holder: Supreme Court’s Legitimacy Can Be Questioned After
Kavanaugh Conﬁrmation, Hill (Oct. 8, 2018), https://thehill.com/homenews/admin
istration/410356-holder-supreme-courts-legitimacy-can-be-questioned-after-kavanaugh
[https://perma.cc/DK6G-R5AV]; see also Tara Leigh Grove, The Supreme Court’s
Legitimacy Dilemma, 132 Harv. L. Rev. 2240, 2240 & n.1, 2241 & nn.2–6, 2252 & n.13 (2019)
(reviewing Fallon, supra note 49) (collecting examples).
51. On the history of such suggestions, see Tara Leigh Grove, The Origins (and Fragility) of Judicial Independence, 71 Vand. L. Rev. 465, 467, 488–517 (2018).
52. Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 49, at 148.
53. See, e.g., Lee Epstein, Jeffrey A. Segal & Jennifer Nicoll Victor, Dynamic AgendaSetting on the United States Supreme Court: An Empirical Assessment, 39 Harv. J. on Legis.
395, 399–403 (2002); Aziz Z. Huq, The Constitutional Law of Agenda Control, 104 Calif. L.
Rev. 1401, 1403 (2016); Daniel B. Magleby, Nathan W. Monroe & Gregory Robinson,
Amendment Politics and Agenda Setting: A Theory With Evidence From the US House of
Representatives, 34 J.L. Econ. & Org. 108, 108–09 (2018).
54. For some famous examples, see, e.g., David P. Baron & John A. Ferejohn, Bargaining in Legislatures, 83 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1181, 1181–82 (1989); Thomas Romer & Howard
Rosenthal, Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas, and the Status Quo, 33 Pub.
Choice 27, 27 (1978).
55. See, e.g., Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 1996
Sup. Ct. Rev. 403, 432–38; Kenneth W. Starr, The Supreme Court and Its Shrinking Docket:
The Ghost of William Howard Taft, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 1363, 1378–82 (2006).
56. See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher & John Sexton, Redeﬁning the Supreme Court’s Role:
A Theory of Managing the Federal Judicial Process 4–6 (1986).
57. Richard J. Lazarus, Docket Capture at the High Court, 119 Yale L.J. Online 89, 89–
90 (2009).
58. See, e.g., David R. Stras, The Supreme Court’s Gatekeepers: The Role of Law Clerks
in the Certiorari Process, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 947, 950 (2007); William H. Rehnquist, Opinion,
Who Writes Decisions of the Supreme Court?, U.S. News & World Rep., Dec. 13, 1957, at
74.
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much power.59 Some point out the consequences of the Court’s tendency
to select questions from narrow doctrinal areas.60 Others have asked why
Congress facilitated much of the expansion of the Court’s agenda-setting
power.61 These studies have largely ignored the statutes that govern the
Court’s appellate jurisdiction as well as the Court’s practice of preselecting
questions.62 This Essay is the ﬁrst to squarely examine the roots of the
Court’s question-selection practices. It questions the uncritical acceptance63 of the Court’s practice by directing attention back to those ignored statutes and their histories.
The Essay proceeds in ﬁve parts. Part I uses the current statute governing certiorari review of lower federal courts to introduce the textual
link between cases and certiorari as distinct from that between certiﬁcation
and questions. It then brieﬂy describes the statutory history described in
greater detail in later parts of the Essay. Part II explores the common law
history of appellate review from the English legal history through most of
nineteenth-century America to understand the role of several important
legal devices: the writs of certiorari and error, and error’s equitable analogue, the appeal. Part III focuses on the Evarts Act, which gave the Court
certiorari power to choose some cases, and its effects. The key takeaway is
that Congress clearly intended—and the Court plainly understood this intent—that the Court take and decide entire cases through certiorari and
decide discrete questions through certiﬁcation. Part IV continues the
story, starting with the Judges’ Bill of 1925, which vastly expanded the
Court’s power over its docket. Once again, Congress and the Court agreed
that certiorari review encompassed entire cases in contrast to certiﬁcation,
59. Benjamin Johnson, The Supreme Court’s Political Docket: How Ideology and the
Chief Justice Control the Court’s Agenda and Shape Law, 50 Conn. L. Rev. 581, 587 (2018).
60. See Daniel Epps & William Ortman, The Lottery Docket, 116 Mich. L. Rev. 705,
717–20 (2018).
61. For various theories, see, e.g., Tom Ginsburg, Judicial Review in New Democracies:
Constitutional Courts in Asian Cases 10–11 (2003) (demonstrating that politics shapes and
is shaped by judicial review); Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative
Deference to the Judiciary, 7 Stud. Am. Pol. Dev. 35, 36 (1993) (punting disruptive political
controversies); Tara Leigh Grove, The Exceptions Clause as a Structural Safeguard, 113
Colum. L. Rev. 929, 940–44 (2013) [hereinafter Grove, Exceptions Clause] (facilitating settlement); Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe, 54 Int’l Org. 217, 228 (2000) (locking in partisan gains); J. Mark
Ramseyer, The Puzzling (In)Dependence of Courts: A Comparative Approach, 23 J. Legal
Stud. 721, 722, 741–42 (1994) (maximizing political inﬂuence during future periods when
a party is out of power); Matthew C. Stephenson, “When the Devil Turns . . . ”: The Political
Foundations of Independent Judicial Review, 32 J. Legal Stud. 59, 63–64, 71–73 (2003) (purchasing insurance); Keith E. Whittington, “Interpose Your Friendly Hand”: Political Supports for the Exercise of Judicial Review by the United States Supreme Court, 99 Am. Pol.
Sci. Rev. 583, 583–84 (2005) (achieving partisan gains and avoiding hard questions).
62. See Kathryn A. Watts, Constraining Certiorari Using Administrative Law Principles,
160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 5 (2011) (noting that scholars “generally have not focused on the
source of the Court’s discretion (namely, delegations from Congress)”).
63. Hartnett, supra note 2, at 1706.
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which limited review to questions. The remainder of Part IV traces the
Court’s subsequent rejection of that agreement in favor of using certiorari
to select questions. Part V ﬁrst explores the consequences of the Court’s
departure from its traditional and statutorily authorized role as a decider
of cases in favor of a self-guided declarer of law. It then contrasts the
Court’s interpretation of the statutes that govern its agenda-control powers
with its interpretation of parallel statutes that guide administrative agencies and lower courts.
I. CASES, QUESTIONS, AND STATUTES
The distinction between cases and questions is subtle but important.
Cases are composed of questions. Questions come in a variety of forms:
procedural, substantive, legal, factual, or mixed.64 For a court to decide a
case, it must answer some—but not necessarily all—questions. Judgment
in a case emerges when a sufficient set of questions has been answered. For
instance, if a federal court determines it does not have subject matter jurisdiction, that single answer is sufficient to dismiss the case.65 If a court
observes that a claim was ﬁled after the relevant statute of limitations expired, that would not be a sufficient answer, since the court would also
have to decide that there were no intervening factors that tolled the statute
of limitations.66 If the claim is late and there is no tolling, then the court
has answered enough of the questions to justify a judgment.67
For an appellate court, the distinction between a case and its constitutive questions intersects with the posture of the case on appeal. Like all
courts, appellate courts must decide a sufficient set of questions to justify
judgment.68 If the lower court got a single question wrong, that might be
64. See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 229,
232–34, 237–38 (1985) (discussing the distinction the legal system attempts to draw between
questions of law and questions of fact).
65. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
66. See Katharine F. Nelson, The 1990 Federal “Fallback” Statute of Limitations: Limitations by Default, 72 Neb. L. Rev. 454, 458–61 (1993) (explaining that a variety of factors
may impact the measurement of statutes of limitation, including “tolling provisions, conditions precedent to ﬁling a claim, and provisions for borrowing other periods of limitations”).
67. See id. at 457 (“If the plaintiff fails to commence the action before the statute of
limitations has run, his or her right to relief is lost.”).
68. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 374–75 (2010)
(Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“When constitutional questions are ‘indispensably necessary’
to resolving the case at hand, ‘the court must meet and decide them.’” (quoting Ex parte
Randolph, 20 F. Cas. 242, 254 (C.C.D. Va. 1833) (No. 11,558))); Md. Cas. Co. v. Jones, 279
U.S. 792, 794–97 (1929) (reversing and remanding when the circuit court of appeals failed
to consider and rule on questions that the Supreme Court deemed essential to a complete
judgment: questions about the assignments of error related to rulings during the trial);
Chad M. Oldfather, Deﬁning Judicial Inactivism: Models of Adjudication and the Duty to
Decide, 94 Geo. L.J. 121, 122, 129–33, 163–64 (2005) (discussing the duty to adjudicate,
what types of questions and arguments courts must rule on in order to satisfy that duty, and
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enough to justify a reversal. On the other hand, the prevailing party below
is still free to defend the judgment below on alternative grounds. This
means that ﬁnding a mistake in a lower court’s justiﬁcations may or may
not be sufficient to overturn the judgment.
However, it will often be the case that there are multiple sufficient
grounds for an appellate court to reverse (or affirm) a judgment.69 So long
as the court answers a sufficient set of questions, it satisﬁes its duty.70 This
gives the court a great deal of freedom as to which questions it will answer
as it fulﬁlls its duty. But this freedom emerges from and can only be exercised in service to the duty to decide cases.71
This duty, and thus the relationship between cases and questions, has
a constitutional dimension. As a matter of plain text, the judicial power
extends to cases and controversies.72 The Framers were not unaware of the
power to answer freestanding questions, as the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court had and maintains that power.73 Thus, any power to answer
questions must be incidental to the judicial duty to decide cases.74 For
Article III purposes, the possibility that some case might depend on the
answer is insufficient justiﬁcation for a federal court to take up a question.
The paradigmatic example of the Court refusing to offer an advisory opinion emerged from its refusal to answer questions of treaty interpretation
that could easily have decided cases.75 Perhaps a cleaner example is the
federal judiciary’s longstanding inability to answer certiﬁed questions
from state courts, even when the answer to the federal question is determinative. In such instances, there is a case that turns on the question, but
the “broad range of judicial behavior that might qualify as a failure to decide” in certain
cases).
69. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 374–75 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); Md. Cas. Co., 279
U.S. at 794–97.
70. See Oldfather, supra note 68, at 163–64 (discussing an example of an appeal in
which a court’s decision on the ﬁrst of three questions may obviate the need to decide the
second and third questions).
71. See id. at 122, 129–33.
72. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 303 (1821) (“By the original text
of the constitution, the judicial power . . . was extended to the following cases, in which
States were parties; to wit, to controversies between two or more States, between a State and
citizens of another State, and between a State and foreign States, citizens, and subjects.”);
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 147 (1803) (stating that the Constitution permits Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction for cases arising under laws and the Constitution
of the United States).
73. Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. R. 1:03.
74. See David E. Engdahl, John Marshall’s “Jeffersonian” Concept of Judicial Review,
42 Duke L.J. 279, 280, 299, 326 (1992) (“[Marshall’s] point—in Marbury as it had been
consistently before—was that the judiciary’s determination of constitutional questions is limited both in opportunity and in authoritative impact to a particular ‘case.’”).
75. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., John F. Manning, Daniel J. Meltzer & David L.
Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and The Federal System 50–58 (7th ed.
2015).
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since that case is not pending before a federal court, the federal judiciary
has no power to answer the question.76
Given this relationship between cases and questions, consider the statute that empowers the Supreme Court to review cases from the courts of
appeals, 28 U.S.C. § 1254:
Cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the
Supreme Court by the following methods:
(1) By writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of any
party to any civil or criminal case, before or after rendition of
judgment or decree;
(2) By certiﬁcation at any time by a court of appeals of any
question of law in any civil or criminal case as to which instructions are desired, and upon such certiﬁcation the Supreme Court
may give binding instructions or require the entire record to be
sent up for decision of the entire matter in controversy.
The statute plainly distinguishes between questions and cases. By statute, the Court can review speciﬁc questions of law when they are certiﬁed by
a lower federal court. Cases may be reviewed in two ways: certiorari or after
a circuit court certiﬁes a question and the Supreme Court orders the lower
court to send up the “entire record . . . for decision of the entire matter in
controversy.”77
The statute makes clear that certiﬁcation differs from certiorari in two
important ways. First, the Court grants certiorari while the courts of appeals certify questions. That is, the two processes differ based on who acts
as the ﬁrst mover. Second, certiﬁcation explicitly applies to questions while
certiorari applies to cases. This distinction is suggestive, though perhaps
not conclusive evidence, that the statute does not give the Court power to
target questions. Indeed, the scholarly defense of the Court’s questionselection power demonstrates only that the statute “do[es] not preclude
the limited grant procedure.”78
If the plain text neither prohibits nor empowers, it does hint at where
one could look for further evidence. The statute prescribes, but does not
deﬁne, a statutory certiorari power. The Court has long recognized that
the statutory grant of certiorari differs in some ways from the traditional
common law writ.79 A promising way forward, then, seems to be to inquire

76. This last point is made clear by the corollary examples of certiﬁed questions in the
statute discussed below and interlocutory appeals in the lower courts. In those instances, the
reviewing court is only answering a question to aid another federal court in its obligation to
decide a live case. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254(2), 1292(b) (2018).
77. Id. § 1254(2).
78. Bice, supra note 3, at 363.
79. There is a similar distinction between the statutory and common law forms of the
writ of habeas corpus. See generally Marc D. Falkoff, Back to Basics: Habeas Corpus Procedures and Long-Term Executive Detention, 86 Denv. U. L. Rev. 961 (2009) (discussing the
history of the statutory and common law forms of habeas corpus); Stephen I. Vladeck, The

2022]

SUPREME COURT QUESTION SELECTION

807

into the history of the writ of certiorari both at common law and in the
statutes.
As to the latter, Congress introduced the statutory writ in 1891 in the
Evarts Act, the same legislation that created the courts of appeals.80 For
modern Court observers, it seems strange to imagine an era when the
Court did not select its cases. In fact, the Court had almost no control over
its agenda until given some such power through the Evarts Act, which was
a response to an overly crowded Supreme Court docket.81 The Act lightened the Court’s future load by creating the modern circuit courts of appeals and gave them the “ﬁnal” word on many types of cases. To allow for
Supreme Court oversight of such doctrinal areas, Congress allowed lower
courts to certify questions to the Supreme Court.82 Certiorari was then included merely as “a sort of fallback provision should the circuit courts of
appeals prove, on occasion, to be surprisingly careless in deciding cases or
issuing certiﬁcates.”83
Even then, the Evarts Act was careful to tie certiorari review—as well
as review if the Court called up the entire matter pursuant to a certiﬁed
question—to writs of error and appeals because those were the primary
devices used to engage the Court’s appellate jurisdiction going back to
1789.84 The Judges’ Bill of 1925, which gave birth to the modern Court by
expanding the set of cases subject to the Court’s certiorari powers, maintained this linkage.85 In language copied nearly word-for-word from the
Evarts Act, the Judges’ Bill empowered the Court to “require by certiorari . . . that the cause be certiﬁed to the Supreme Court for determination
by it with the same power and authority, and with like effect, as if the cause
had been brought there by unrestricted writ of error or appeal.”86 Similarly, the statute allowed circuit courts of appeals
to certify to the Supreme Court . . . any questions or propositions
of law concerning which instructions are desired for the proper
decision of the cause; and thereupon the Supreme Court may
either give binding instructions on the questions and propositions certiﬁed or may require that the entire record in the cause
be sent up for its consideration, and thereupon shall decide the

New Habeas Revisionism, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 941 (2011) (reviewing Paul D. Halliday, Habeas
Corpus: From England to Empire (2012)) (same).
80. See Hartnett, supra note 2, at 1651–57.
81. See id. at 1649–57.
82. Id. For discussion regarding the use of certiﬁcation, see H.R. Res. 9014, 51st Cong.,
21 Cong. Rec. 3402 (1890); H.R. Rep. No. 50-942, at 1–4 (1888); 21 Cong. Rec. 10,222
(1890) (statement of Sen. William M. Evarts).
83. Hartnett, supra note 2, at 1656.
84. See id. at 1655 & n.52.
85. See infra section IV.A.
86. Judiciary Act of 1925 (Judges’ Bill of 1925), Pub. L. No. 68-415, § 240(a), 43 Stat.
936, 938–39.
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whole matter in controversy in the same manner as if it had been
brought there by writ of error or appeal.87
To explore the statutory writ of certiorari, then, we must also uncover
what was required by writs of error and appeals. Such an understanding
can serve multiple purposes. First, it informs our understanding of the statute. Congress had something in mind when it granted the Court certiorari
power. Its plan was explicitly premised on the writ of error and the appeal.88
Second, the history of error and appeal informs an inquiry into an
alternative basis for the Court’s power to target questions. One might imagine that the power to select questions is simply implied by the nature of
appellate review. If appellate courts proceeding on error or appeal could
select their questions, that would provide strong evidence that the Court’s
core appellate powers include the power to limit grants of certiorari to
preselected questions. Yet the history reveals instead that the Court never
wielded such power. Indeed, the Court implicitly disclaimed this power
numerous times throughout its history.89
II. COMMON LAW ORIGINS AND EARLY AMERICAN PRACTICE
The writ of certiorari is an ancient legal device with roots dating back
to medieval England.90 The writ requires a lower court or tribunal to certify
the record of a proceeding and to send it to a higher court for review.91
Historically, certiorari was rarely used to obtain jurisdiction on appeal. The
First Judiciary Act maintained this tradition by giving the Supreme Court
appellate jurisdiction over common law cases through writs of error and
over cases in equity, admiralty, and other areas through appeals.92 Writs of
error required the appellate court to review the entire record (and only
the record) for legal error.93 Appeals were the equitable analogue to the
writ of error.94 The difference was that on appeal, the reviewing court had
87. Id. § 239, 43 Stat. at 938. The older statute explicitly required the Court to proceed
on certiorari as if on a writ of error or appeal, but Congress removed that language for
stylistic reasons in 1948. See infra section IV.D.
88. See infra section II.C.
89. See infra section II.D.
90. See infra section II.B.
91. See, e.g., A.T. Carter, A History of the English Courts 57–58 (6th ed. 1935).
92. Judiciary Act of 1789, Pub. L. No. 1-20, § 3, 1 Stat. 73, 81.
93. There were some exceptional facts reviewable on error, such as whether the relevant party was an infant, but such exceptions were limited, well-deﬁned, and irrelevant to
the larger appeals process. See Carter, supra note 91, at 58.
94. See United States v. Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 108, 110–11 (1812) (“An appeal
is a civil law process, and removes a cause entirely, subjecting the law and fact, to a review
and retrial. A writ of error is a common law process, and removes for re-examination, nothing but the law.”); see also Wiscart v. D’Auchy, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 321, 327 (1796) (Elsworth,
C.J., concurring) (comparing appeals and the writ of error in a similar fashion to the Court’s
discussion in Goodwin).
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an obligation to decide questions of law and facts.95 The key takeaway is
that both writs of error and appeals required review of the entire record—
not just a subset of questions. Their respective histories are important because, as will be seen, Congress always channeled the Supreme Court’s appellate powers—even certiorari powers—through the writ of error and the
appeal.
This Part explores the history of these traditional appellate devices
with particular attention to practice before the Supreme Court from the
Founding through the late nineteenth century. It begins by explaining the
common law roots of the writs of error and certiorari. It then explores how
these devices ﬂowered in the ﬁrst century of Supreme Court practice. It
concludes by considering the powerful example of Murdock v. City of
Memphis.96
A.

The Writ of Error

Throughout most recorded English legal history, the writ of error was
used to challenge a decision of a common law court of record.97 When
proceeding on error, the reviewing court only had power to examine legal
determinations, since factual determinations were within the province of
juries.98 After deciding the questions of law,99 the reviewing court would
return the case to the trial court for additional proceedings consistent with
the decision.100
It was at ﬁrst not clear how one could challenge the decision of a judge
or jury without challenging the integrity of that judge or those jurors.101 As

95. For good accounts of the history of error and appeal, see J.H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History 135–43 (4th ed. 2005); see also 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Law of England 453–55 (1773); William Searle Holdsworth, History of
English Law 373 (1922).
96. Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1874).
97. See Baker, supra note 95, at 136–38. Other common law writs worked to a similar
purpose. For example, a writ of attainment could be used to challenge a jury verdict as false,
an action of deceit was used to reverse a judgment obtained by fraud in the court of common
pleas, and an arrest of judgment was used when there was an error or defect in the proceedings (e.g., a verdict inconsistent with the pleadings or a declaration insufficient to justify the
underlying action). See John Palmer, Practice in the House of Lords, on Appeals, Writs of
Error, and Claims of Peerage 117–18 (1830).
98. See Palmer, supra note 97, at 129–30.
99. Factual errors that would limit the jurisdiction of the court and might not appear
on the face of the record could be raised. Palmer mentions three speciﬁc instances: (1)
minors who sue or are sued in their own names; (2) married women who sue or are sued
without their husbands; and (3) when a party dies before a verdict or interlocutory judgment. See id. at 131–32.
100. See id. at 175–76.
101. See 2 Frederick Pollock & Frederic William Maitland, The History of English Law
Before the Time of Edward I, at 668 (1898) (“The idea of a complaint against a judgment
which is not an accusation against a judge is not easily formed.”). See generally John H.
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a result, procedures in error originated as quasi-criminal proceedings that
effectively charged the jury with perjury or the judge with malfeasance.102
Accordingly, an appeal on a writ of error was not merely a further stage of
ongoing litigation; it was a new proceeding. This had consequences for the
writ’s further development.103 Since it was a new action, the old action had
to be completed. To get a writ of error, the judgment in the earlier case
had to be ﬁnal, and plaintiffs in error had to be able to point to the defect
in the now-completed trial that caused them damage. If they could do so,
the defendants in error were summoned to defend the judgment.104
A writ of error commanded judges from lower common law courts to
dispatch the record of a legal proceeding to a higher court for review. The
record—also known as a plea roll—consisted of the formal minutes of litigation from inception to judgment;105 it provided conclusive proof of its
contents,106 and it was the sole basis for review. Appellate courts could not
look behind the record to see if either there were errors not apparent in
the record or if errors that did appear in the record actually occurred.
The writ of error expanded over time to allow higher courts greater
latitude in reviewing trial courts. Initially, review was limited only to information contained on the face of the parchment.107 This limited and technical review provided too little information for higher courts to attend to
anything but superﬁcial formalities.108 Accordingly, in 1285, the Statute of
Westminster introduced a second writ of error that enabled review based

Langbein, Renee Lettow Lerner & Bruce P. Smith, History of the Common Law: The Development of Anglo-American Legal Institutions 416–19 (2d ed. 2009) (describing the medieval remedy for false jury verdicts, which included not just reversing the verdict, but also
imposing “savage penalties” on the jurors for their wrongdoing).
102. See Holdsworth, supra note 95, at 213–14.
103. See id. at 214.
104. Review was initially at the King’s Bench, since the writ of error was a prerogative of
the King. Writs of error in civil cases quickly became a matter of right. In criminal cases, the
King had discretion to grant or withhold the writ until 1705. See Holdsworth, supra note
95, at 214–15; see also Joseph Henry Smith, Appeals to the Privy Council From the American
Plantations 111 (1950). The ﬁnal say on a writ of error, however, came to rest with the House
of Lords. See Baker, supra note 95, at 137.
105. Baker, supra note 95, at 136.
106. See Blackstone, supra note 95, at 406–07 (“A writ of error lies for some supposed
mistake in the proceedings of a court of record; . . . [t]he writ of error only lies upon matter
of law arising upon the face of the proceedings, so that no evidence is required to substantiate or support it.”). The incontestability of the record seems to have emerged from extending the King’s privilege of not being contradicted about what happened in his presence
to the King’s courts. See also Note, Inﬂuence of the Writ of Error on the Scope of Appellate
Review in the Federal Courts, 32 Colum. L. Rev. 860, 861–62 (1932).
107. Baker, supra note 95, at 136; see also Blackstone, supra note 95, at 23–24 (noting
that the “truth [of the record] is not to be called in question[;] . . . nothing shall be averred
against a record, nor shall any plea, or even proof, be admitted to the contrary”).
108. See Baker, supra note 95, at 136–37.
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on a bill of exceptions.109 The plaintiff in error wrote down the legal rulings made by the trial judge and the exceptions the plaintiff in error made
to those rulings, and the judge would seal these exceptions and attach the
bill to the parchment record.110
Even with these changes, the writ of error was still inadequate for the
purpose of searching review.111 Important facts were left out of the record,
making substantive review of the evidence largely impossible.112 Similarly,
legal determinations were usually absent from the parchment, often making legal review unavailable.113 Thus, prior to the sixteenth century, review
on a writ of error was still largely a technical exercise.114 Legal reforms in
the sixteenth century—notably the rise of actions on the case and special
verdicts—led to more details being included in the record.115
With more in the record, there was more to review for error, including
points of law. This proved both a blessing and a curse. The writ required
the higher court to revoke the lower court’s judgment if any error appeared on the record, even where the lower court was correct on the merits and had erred on only a technical point.116 Assuming the lower court
had made a signiﬁcant mistake, expanding the record increased the
chances that the higher court would have adequate grounds to reverse.
But if the lower court had ruled correctly but made a technical error, the
more voluminous record increased the chances the higher court would be
compelled to reverse on a technicality.117 Thus, in the words of one commentary, “it may be doubted whether the disadvantages attending the
Writs of Error at that early period, did not overbalance the beneﬁt derived
from them.”118

109. See Statute of Westminster II 1285, 13 Edw. c. 35, § XXXI (Eng.).
110. See Holdsworth, supra note 95, at 223–24.
111. See, e.g., id. at 224 (noting multiple reasons for the inadequacy of review based on
a bill of exceptions).
112. See Baker, supra note 95, at 137; see also Holdsworth, supra note 95, at 215–16
(“[T]he writ could do nothing to remedy the only errors that were really substantial.”).
113. See Holdsworth, supra note 95, at 215–16.
114. See Baker, supra note 95, at 137; see also Holdsworth, supra note 95, at 223.
115. Holdsworth, supra note 95, at 223.
116. See id. at 223–24 (“[The writ] was too wide because any error on the record, however triﬂing, was ground for a writ . . . .”).
117. Blackstone, supra note 95, at 407 (“[S]uitors were much perplexed by writs of error
brought upon very slight and trivial grounds, as misspellings and other mistakes of the
clerks . . . .”); see also Palmer, supra note 97, at 120 (“After verdicts and Judgments given
upon the merits, they were frequently reversed for slips of the pen, or mis-spellings; and
Justice was perpetually entangled in a net of mere technical jargon.”). This was possible
because “once the record was made up, it was formerly held that by the common law no
amendment could be permitted, unless within the very term[s] in which the judicial act so
recorded was done; for during the term the record is in the breast of the court, but afterward
it admitted of no alteration.” Blackstone, supra note 95, at 407.
118. Palmer, supra note 97, at 124.

812

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 122:793

By the eighteenth century, statutory reforms and judicial innovations
had liberalized procedures to amend the record to correct technical defects so that “triﬂing exceptions are so thoroughly guarded against that
writs of error cannot now be maintained but for some material mistake
assigned.”119 Importantly, material mistakes came not only to include material mistakes in form but also substantive mistakes including “a wrong
Decision on the merits of the Case.”120
Clearly, the writ of error underwent signiﬁcant liberalization over the
centuries. Nonetheless, its core remained unchanged: The reviewing
court—usually the King’s Bench or the Lords—would review the entire
(and gradually expanded) record for legal error.121 The legal questions
that needed answering were contained in that record, and the court’s
power to answer those questions was entirely incidental to its obligation to
examine the record and correct the legal errors contained therein.122
Moreover, the changes themselves always followed a consistent pattern. First, changes were always designed to help the appellate court do
justice in the case. Each change brought additional questions and more
materials to the reviewing court, giving those judges more work.123 The
changes did not give the court greater ﬂexibility to avoid questions. Second, the signiﬁcant changes to the writ were accomplished by statute.
While courts worked at the margins to ensure that typographical errors
would not subvert justice, fundamental transformations of the writ apparently required Parliament.124
B.

The Writ of Certiorari

Certiorari is a writ that orders an inferior tribunal to certify and send
all records to the higher court.125 The key phrase was “certiorari volumus”:
119. Blackstone, supra note 95, at 408; see also Palmer, supra note 97, at 120; cf.
Blackstone, supra note 95, at 407.
120. Palmer, supra note 97, at 118.
121. See Baker, supra note 95, at 136–38. The device used to remit the proceedings was
called a remittitur. See George Jarvis Thompson, Development of the Anglo-American Judicial System, 17 Cornell L. Rev. 395, 426 n.525 (1932).
122. See Baker, supra note 95, at 137 (noting that, originally, error did not encompass
legal questions but did require review of the entire record; and the writ of error could not
contribute to legal development until answers to legal questions were included in the record).
123. Whether this trend reﬂected the interests of justice or the ﬁnancial interests of
judges—who received fees from plaintiffs—is unclear. For the latter explanation, see Daniel
Klerman, Jurisdictional Competition and the Evolution of the Common Law, 74 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1179, 1218–19 (2007).
124. See, e.g., Statute of Westminster II 1285, 13 Edw. c. 35, § XXXI (Eng.) (making it
possible for plaintiffs in error to attach exceptions to the record).
125. See James E. Pfander, Jurisdiction-Stripping and the Supreme Court’s Power to
Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1433, 1444 (2000) [hereinafter Pfander, Jurisdiction-Stripping] (“Certiorari effected the removal of a judicial record or cause (often an
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“[W]e wish to be informed.”126 The King used the writ as a tool of governance,127 but English courts came to use this writ in distinct ways.
The oldest and most common use of the writ was to order the transfer
of records to a superior court.128 When reviewing a lower court’s decision,
the appellate court needed the full record. If parts of the record were still
at the lower court, the reviewing court would issue a certiorari to bring the
remaining parts of the record up for review.129
A second use emerged primarily in criminal cases.130 The King’s
Bench used certiorari to remove a case when the accused could not get a
fair trial in the lower court.131 Until the seventeenth century, this use of
certiorari was limited to review of indictments.132 Once the indictment was
brought before the King’s Bench, that court would hold the trial itself,
quash the indictment, or send it for trial in the country.133 However, since
review was limited to the indictments, it was often superﬁcial and limited
to technical defects.134
Finally, certiorari could issue “in the nature of a writ of error.”135 Dating back to King Edward I, the writ ran to courts to take jurisdiction over
appeals as if on error.136 The practice then expanded over time to cover
review by other tribunals. By the time of the early Stuarts, certiorari was
also used to bring administrative actions before the King’s Bench.137 Originally, the King’s Bench oversaw the justices of the peace, who were in

indictment) from a lower court for trial or other disposition in King’s Bench.”). Holdsworth
helpfully includes various versions of the language of writs of certiorari. See Holdsworth,
supra note 95, at 658–59. For a history of certiorari from the Middle Ages to the twentieth
century, see Jerome J. Hanus, Certiorari and Policy-Making in English History, 12 Am. J.
Legal Hist. 63 (1968).
126. See Baker, supra note 95, at 148 n.78.
127. See S. A. de Smith, The Prerogative Writs, 11 Cambridge L.J. 40, 45 (1951).
128. See Baker, supra note 95, at 148; see also Holdsworth, supra note 95, at 228.
129. See Frank J. Goodnow, The Writ of Certiorari, 6 Pol. Sci. Q. 493, 500 (1891).
130. See, e.g., Blackstone, supra note 95, at 320–21.
131. Id. at 265. This was apparently not an uncommon practice in the ﬁfteenth and
sixteenth centuries. See Holdsworth, supra note 95, at 213.
132. See Baker, supra note 95, at 148.
133. Id. Certiorari accomplished this in tandem with habeas corpus, which could require production of the body but not the record, whereas certiorari could demand the record but not the person. See Dallin H. Oaks, The “Original” Writ of Habeas Corpus in the
Supreme Court, 1962 Sup. Ct. Rev. 153, 182.
134. Baker, supra note 95, at 148–49.
135. de Smith, supra note 127, at 46.
136. Id.
137. See Pfander, Jurisdiction-Stripping, supra note 125, at 1446–47 (“[I]n 1700, Lord
Chief Justice Holt of King’s Bench relied on the writ of certiorari to secure judicial review
of the decisions of an administrative tribunal.”).

814

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 122:793

charge of local administrative matters.138 The rule soon came to be that
“certiorari would lie to any body created by statute which acted judicially . . . ; statutes creating powers outside the common law were to be
strictly construed; and before conviction a man was entitled to be summoned so that he had an opportunity to present his case.”139 Thus, the
Crown used the King’s Bench to ensure justice was done administratively,
and the writ of certiorari was its key tool in that effort.
Importantly, all of these uses of certiorari only allowed the superior
court to review an existing record for defects. In the ﬁrst instance, the record was already before the higher court but was incomplete. In the latter
instances, certiorari was used to bring the record before the reviewing
court for the ﬁrst time. Certiorari did not permit courts to hold new trials
or examine facts as if on appeal,140 and it did not offer the reviewing court
the opportunity to select individual questions or issues for review. Instead,
common law certiorari enabled courts to proceed as if on a writ of error.141
C.

The First Century of Supreme Court Appellate Review

It was against this backdrop that the First Congress drafted the
Judiciary Act of 1789, which gave the Supreme Court “appellate jurisdiction from the circuit courts and courts of the several states, in the cases
herein after specially provided for.”142 The Act provided for Supreme
Court review in civil cases through the writ of error and appeals, both of
which issued as a matter of right; if the appellant ﬁlled out the paperwork
correctly, review was effectively mandatory.143 Appeals were effectively the
equitable analogue to the common law writ of error. There were, however,
notable differences: Equity offered its own set of remedies, there was no
jury, and all testimony was written. Accordingly, when reviewing appeals
(as opposed to writs of error), the appellate court had a complete, and
therefore much more voluminous, set of documents to review. The reason
for the additional factual material was that review on appeal covered both
law and facts.144

138. See Parrillo, Originalist Case Against Administrative Regulatory Power, supra note
18, at 1419–21.
139. Baker, supra note 95, at 149.
140. Id. at 149.
141. See, e.g., Hamburger, Law and Judicial Duty, supra note 24, at 387–90.
142. Judiciary Act of 1789, Pub. L. No. 1-20, § 13, 1 Stat. 73, 81.
143. See John M. Simpson, Turning Over the Reigns: The Abolition of the Mandatory
Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 6 Hastings Const. L.Q. 297, 303 n.23 (1978).
John Simpson notes that, while some states treated writs of error as discretionary, the Court
followed the traditional English rule: “The mandatory nature of the writ of error had its
roots ﬁrmly entrenched in English jurisprudence.” Id. at 304.
144. See generally Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure,
Due Process, and the Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 Cornell L. Rev. 1181,
1198–210 (2005) (outlining developments over time in equity doctrine and procedure).
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The Court’s certiorari powers ﬂowed from section fourteen of the
Judiciary Act, a section that has come to be known as the All Writs Act.145
That section gave all federal courts “power to issue writs of scire facias, habeas corpus, and all other writs not specially provided for by statute, which
may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and
agreeable to the principles and usages of law.”146 Certiorari plainly fell
within the “all other writs not specially provided for” category.
The Supreme Court recognized three uses of certiorari that tracked
the traditional common law usage of the writ explained above. First, certiorari “issue[s] as original process, to remove a cause, and change the
venue, when the Superior Court is satisﬁed, that a fair and impartial trial
will not otherwise be obtained.”147 Second, “it is sometimes used, as auxiliary process, where, for instance, diminution of the record is [alleged], on
a writ of error: But in such cases, the Superior Court must have jurisdiction
of the controversy.”148 Third, a certiorari was used “to bring up after judgment the proceedings of an inferior court . . . in the nature of a writ of
error.”149
The Supreme Court used certiorari almost exclusively to complete the
record of a case before it on a writ of error.150 For more than a century
following the First Judiciary Act, the Court never took a case through certiorari.151 While it acknowledged that taking cases was one traditional use
of the writ, it never used the writ that way itself.152 Instead, the Court relied
almost entirely on writs of error and appeals to ﬁll out its appellate juris-

One way in which the First Judiciary Act differed from the English practice was the more
expansive set of remedies available to the Court after appellate review. Traditionally, the
reviewing court on a writ of error had to either affirm or reverse for a new trial. The Judiciary
Act allowed the Court “to render such judgment . . . as the district court should have rendered.” Judiciary Act of 1789, Pub. L. No. 1-20, § 24, 1 Stat. 73, 85; see also Aaron-Andrew
P. Bruhl, The Remand Power and the Supreme Court’s Role, 96 Notre Dame L. Rev. 171,
188–89 (2020) (discussing the difference between review on a writ of error and appeal).
145. Today, this section is codiﬁed at 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2018).
146. Judiciary Act of 1789 § 14, 1 Stat. at 81–82. The short-lived Judiciary Act of 1801
expressly gave the Court certiorari power. See James E. Pfander, Marbury, Original Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court’s Supervisory Powers, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1515, 1583–84 n.285
(2001).
147. Fowler v. Lindsey, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 411, 412–15 (1799) (opinion of Washington, J.).
148. Id.
149. Harris v. Barber, 129 U.S. 366, 369 (1889).
150. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 94 U.S. 258, 259–60 (1876) (explaining that “this
court” only uses the writ of certiorari “[a]s auxiliary process to enable a court to obtain
further information in respect to some matter already before it for adjudication”).
151. See infra notes 261–266 and accompanying text.
152. See Young, 94 U.S. at 259–60 (noting that one of the two purposes “[a]t common
law” for the writ of certiorari is “[a]s an appellate proceeding for the re-examination of
some action of an inferior tribunal” but that “this court” does not employ certiorari for that
purpose).
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diction. This reliance on error and appeal meant that the Court’s appellate docket was almost entirely mandatory and always required the Court
to decide cases rather than to select preferred questions.
1. Statutory Jurisdiction Over Cases. — Under the Judiciary Act, appeals
and writs of error applied somewhat differently to cases depending on
whether they arose in state or federal courts. For cases emerging from state
courts, appeals and writs of error were only available to litigants under limited circumstances. The 1789 Act placed four requirements on cases
emerging from state courts. First, the Court could only review “ﬁnal judgment[s] or decree[s]” from “the highest court of law or equity of a
State.”153 Second, the case needed to fall within one of three categories.154
Third, such cases required a certiﬁcate signed by the chief judge of the
lower court or any Justice of the Supreme Court.155 Fourth, the Supreme
Court could only address federal issues in the cases.156
Most analyses of this aspect of the early Court’s jurisdiction focus on
the second of these categories: the types of issues that would elevate a state
case to the Supreme Court.157 However, for present purposes, the other
three are particularly important. First, the requirement that the case must
be ﬁnal conformed Supreme Court review to the traditional writ of error.158 Further, the requirement of ﬁnality guaranteed the Court would
possess the completed record when it decided the case. The statute did
not permit (and to this day does not permit) the Supreme Court to reach
into ongoing state litigation to address individual questions.
Similarly, the procedural requirement that cases required a certiﬁcate
plays an interesting and informative role. Because the certiﬁcate had to be
signed by either the chief judge of the state’s highest court or a Justice of

153. Judiciary Act of 1789, Pub. L. No. 1-20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85.
154. The three categories were: (1) The state court ruled against the validity of a federal
statute, treaty, or “an authority exercised under the United States”; (2) the state court ruled
in favor of a state statute or exercise of state authority against a constitutional challenge; or
(3) “where is drawn in question the construction of any clause of the constitution, or of a
treaty, or statute of, or commission held under the United States, and the decision is against
the title, right, privilege or exemption specially set up or claimed by either party, under such
clause.” Id. § 25, 1 Stat. at 85–86.
155. Id. § 25, 1 Stat. at 86.
156. Id. § 25, 1 Stat. at 86–87.
157. See, e.g., Lawrence Gene Sager, The Supreme Court 1980 Term—Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress’ Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal
Courts, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 17, 58–60 (1981); Paul Taylor, Congress’s Power to Regulate the
Federal Judiciary: What the First Congress and the First Federal Courts Can Teach Today’s
Congress and Courts, 37 Pepp. L. Rev. 847, 861–76 (2010); Ann Woolhandler, Powers,
Rights, and Section 25, 86 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1241, 1242–43 (2011).
158. Recall that the writ of error emerged as a new proceeding to contest the ﬁnal judgment of another court. Thus, the lower court’s decision needed to be ﬁnal before it could
be reviewed on error. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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the Supreme Court, the writ would not be allowed if there was no signature.159 If the chief judge of the state court refused to sign the certiﬁcate,
the appellant could apply to the Justice of the Supreme Court with responsibility for that circuit.160 That Justice could sign the certiﬁcate, deny it, or
refer it to the full Court.161 Publicly, the Court said that the only relevant
consideration for the Justice was whether the appeal involved a question
properly within the Court’s appellate jurisdiction.162 In practice, however,
the Justices would not sign certiﬁcates if they would simply end up affirming the state court.163
The certiﬁcate requirement thus played something of a screening role
for review of state court cases.164 The Court’s ability to refuse a certiﬁcate
was its primary source of discretion. This teaches two lessons: First, the
Court was willing and able to dodge cases, though it thought it only proper
to do so under limited circumstances (e.g., when the lower court judges
and Supreme Court Justices agreed that the case outcome was obvious);
second, discretion operated at the case level. The certiﬁcate did not operate at the level of individual questions. Instead, the Court signed the certiﬁcate and took the entire case.
Finally, the limitation of review to federal questions makes two points
clear. First, Congress was able to recognize a distinction between review of
cases and review of a subset of the questions within a case, and it was able
to direct the Court accordingly. Second, Congress understood that the
Court was not the proper institution to make the determination as to what
questions it should answer. Its job was to decide the whole case unless
Congress removed some questions from its jurisdiction.
The early Court was also clear about its obligation to decide cases rather than questions. Justice Marshall’s words in Cohens v. Virginia, quoted
above,165 bear repeating:
With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be
attended, we must decide it, if it be brought before us. . . . Questions may occur which we would gladly avoid; but we cannot avoid
them. All we can do is, to exercise our best judgment, and conscientiously to perform our duty.166

159. See Simpson, supra note 143, at 305.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 305–06 (citing Twitchell v. Pennsylvania, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 321, 324–25
(1868)).
163. Id. at 306.
164. Id. at 306–07 (“With these early screening techniques, the Court was determining
whether the plaintiff in error had made out a prima facie case under the jurisdictional statute.”).
165. See supra text accompanying note 23.
166. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821).
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Dodging a hard question or failing to decide a case properly before
the Court would be “treason to the constitution.”167 For Marshall, the writ
of error did not provide the power to select or to avoid questions; it provided the obligation to decide cases, even if that meant taking up questions
the Court would rather avoid.
D. Procedures: Bringing the Whole Case to the Court
1. The Writ of Error. — For the ﬁrst century of the Court’s existence,
the writ of error was the Court’s sole method to reexamine legal decisions
by lower courts in common law matters.168 The procedures were, roughly,
as follows. The party losing in the lower court would petition the Supreme
Court for a writ of error.169 The writ then issued as a matter of right by the
Supreme Court to the lower court.170 To proceed further—for the writ to
be allowed—the plaintiff in error, as the appellant was known, would have
to attach four things to the writ and ﬁle it with the Court by a date provided
in the writ itself.171
First, the Court required “an authenticated transcript of the record.”172 The record itself consisted of four pieces: a summary of the pleadings, a jury statement,173 the bill of exceptions, and the judgment.174 Of
these features, the bill of exceptions is perhaps the most important. It was
the plaintiff in error’s vehicle to set out the relevant evidence from trial or
material facts the Court would need to decide the legal issues raised. This
factual recitation had to walk a careful line because the Court was not concerned about factual determinations on a writ of error, but some facts were
necessary in order to answer the questions of law.175 The exceptions raised
167. Id.
168. See supra section II.C.
169. See 1 George Ticknor Curtis, Commentaries on the Jurisdiction, Practice, and Peculiar Jurisprudence of the Courts of the United States § 177, at 224–26, § 361, at 502 (1854)
(noting that for “ﬁnal” judgments of lower courts, “the party against whom the judgment is
rendered can alone sue out the writ”).
170. See, e.g., Campbell v. Doe, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 244, 247 (1851) (“As both parties
claim under an act of Congress, either, is entitled to a writ of error to have the judgment
against the right asserted, revised in this court.”). The Act of May 8, 1792 required that writs
issue in the name of the Chief Justice. Act of May 8, 1792, Pub. L. No. 2-3, § 1, 1 Stat. 275,
275–76.
171. Judiciary Act of 1789, Pub. L. No. 1-20, § 22, 1 Stat. 73, 84.
172. Curtis, supra note 169, § 377, at 510–11.
173. Id. § 381, at 512 (“A statement of the empanelling of the jury to try the issue made
by the pleadings, the trial, and the verdict . . . .”).
174. Id.
175. The Court might get testy if litigants stuffed the record full of factual matters that
did not pertain to the legal questions at issue on error. See, e.g., Carver v. Jackson ex dem.
Astor, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 1, 80–81 (1830) (“[T]he practice . . . of bringing the charge of the
court below, at length, before this court for review . . . is an unauthorised practice, and extremely inconvenient both to the inferior and to the appellate court.”). Justice Joseph Story
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in this part of the record were limited to exceptions raised during trial
pertaining to legal determinations and evidentiary rulings.176 Thus, along
with the facts, the bill of exceptions had to carefully point to the rulings or
jury instructions that the plaintiff in error objected to at trial.
Along with the record, the writ was to be accompanied by a prayer for
relief and an assignment of error.177 The latter was the list of errors alleged
by the plaintiff in error. Even though parties asked the Court to consider
speciﬁc questions, the Court’s judicial duty on error required examining
the entire record. The Court could not cherry-pick its own questions. It
could and would reverse based on errors not assigned so long as the exception was made at trial and included in the record.178 As the Court put
it, “[I]t is the duty of the court to give judgment on the whole record, and
not merely on the points started by counsel.”179
2. Appeals. — A key feature of the writ of error process was that the
appellate court had to decide the entire legal case—not just particular
questions of interest to the court or to counsel.180 The same was true for
appeals, except review on appeal encompassed facts as well as legal questions.181 Unlike cases at law, equity did not have a jury.182 Facts were for the
court to determine. Accordingly, a key difference for the Court between
an appeal and a writ of error was that only the former brought facts before
the Court.183
The Judiciary Act of 1801 set out the procedures for an appeal: A
“transcript of the libel, bill, answer, depositions, and all other proceedings
of what kind soever in the cause, shall be transmitted to the said supreme

was particularly annoyed by the practice. See David Lynch, The Role of the Circuit Courts
in the Formation of United States Law in the Early Republic: Following Supreme Court
Justices Washington, Livingston, Story and Thompson 123 (2018) (“Story was unhappy with
the long-accepted tradition of excessively lengthy pleadings and legal argument because it
stood in the way of a reasonably manageable docket.”).
176. Curtis, supra note 169, § 382, at 513.
177. The ﬁnal element necessary to bring a case before the Supreme Court on a writ of
error was “a citation to the adverse party, signed by the judge of such district court, or a
Justice of the Supreme Court, the adverse party having at least twenty days’ notice.” Judiciary
Act of 1789, Pub. L. No. 1-20, § 22, 1 Stat. 73, 84.
178. See Garland v. Davis, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 131, 143 (1846) (noting that, although “exceptions to the opinions given by courts below must all be taken at the time the opinions
are pronounced[,] . . . when the whole record is before the court above,” counsel may take
“any exception appearing on it . . . which could have been taken below”).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See United States v. Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 108, 110–11 (1812); Wiscart v.
D’Auchy, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 321, 327 (1796) (opinion of Elsworth, C.J.).
182. See Baker, supra note 95, at 103.
183. See Ira Mickenberg, Abusing the Exceptions and Regulations Clause: Legislative
Attempts to Divest the Supreme Court of Appellate Jurisdiction, 32 Am. U. L. Rev. 497, 517
(1983).
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court . . . .”184 Further, “no new evidence shall be received in the said
court, on the hearing of such appeal . . . .”185
The Act of March 3, 1803 clariﬁed the subject matters appropriate for
appeals, and by implication, it carved out the proper scope of writs of error.186 The statute, however, clearly linked the procedures for the two
methods. By referring to the “rules, regulations, and restrictions” provided
for writs of error, the statute required that appeals follow the same timeline
and provide the same appellate bond as required for writs of error.187
The record for an appeal was to contain all of the evidence from the
trial.188 Before the 1803 Act, the substance of the testimony was included
in the judge’s report as part of the statement of facts and sent up along
with the record.189 The 1803 Act, however, effectively repealed the provision in the First Judiciary Act that required the record to include a statement of facts in equity cases.190 Instead, the record was supposed to include
“depositions, and all other proceedings of what kind soever in the
cause.”191 The Court required “that all the testimony on which the judge
founds his opinion, should, in cases within the jurisdiction of this Court,
appear in the record.”192 Effectively, any oral testimony must be reduced
to writing and included in the record for an appeal.193
These differences between appeals and writs of error should not obscure the shared obligatory nature of the two. On appeal, the Court said,
“[I]t would seem, since this Court must judge of the fact, as well as the law,
that all the testimony which was before the Circuit Court ought to be laid
before this court.”194 This statement explains the procedural similarities
and differences between the two appellate devices; more importantly, it
demonstrates that the Court understood it had an independent duty to
examine all of the law and facts relevant to the appeal. On appeal, as on

184. Judiciary Act of 1801, Pub. L. No. 6-4, § 33, 2 Stat. 89, 99.
185. Id. The Act went on to require that “such appeals shall be subject to the same rules,
regulations and restrictions, as are prescribed by law in case of writs of error; and that the
said supreme court shall be, and hereby is authorized and required, to receive, hear and
determine such appeals.” Id.
186. See The San Pedro, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 132, 138–42 (1817) (interpreting the Act
of 1803 to mean that, in common law cases, “[t]he writ of error . . . remains in force” and
submits only issues of law to the Court, whereas appeals are “conﬁned to admiralty and
equity cases, and bring[] before the supreme court” issues of fact and law).
187. Curtis, supra note 169, § 408, at 533.
188. Ferdinand Fairfax Stone, The Record on Appeal in Civil Cases, 23 Va. L. Rev. 766,
770 (1937).
189. Id.
190. See Act of Mar. 3, 1803, Pub. L. No. 7-4, § 2, 2 Stat. 244, 244.
191. Id.
192. Conn v. Penn, 18 U.S. 424, 426 (1820).
193. Curtis, supra note 169, § 413, at 535–36.
194. Conn, 18 U.S. at 426.
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error, there was no picking and choosing.195
These appellate procedures are consistent with the statutory mandate
to decide the entire case. For a writ of error, the Court needed the full
record, not just the parts the plaintiff in error wanted reviewed. For appeals, the Court needed all the facts as well. Congress and the Court
adopted and maintained these traditional processes in order to achieve
the traditional ends of the writ of error and the appeal: to decide cases.
3. Murdock v. City of Memphis. — Many of these points appear in
Murdock v. City of Memphis.196 The case is famous for the Court’s determination that it lacked jurisdiction over the state law question on an appeal
from a state court.197 The Court concluded that Congress did not grant
jurisdiction over such questions.198 Buried within the opinion, however, is
an extended discussion of the writ of error and appeal.199
The case grew out of a dispute over land that Murdock’s ancestors
once owned.200 They had donated the land to the city so the federal government could use it for a naval depot.201 The gift included language that
seemingly would cause the land to revert to the original owners if it was
not used for a naval base.202 Many years later, an act of Congress closed the
depot and returned the land to the city.203 Murdock raised state and federal claims in an effort to regain ownership of the land.204 After losing below, Murdock petitioned the Court to review on error.205 Murdock argued
that “the office of a writ of error . . . is to remove the whole case to this

195. Indeed, Congress made the obligatory nature of appeal explicit. See Act of Mar. 3,
1803 § 2, 2 Stat. at 244.
196. Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1874). For a fuller account of
the historical background, see generally William M. Wiecek, Murdock v. Memphis: Section 25
of the 1789 Judiciary Act and Judicial Federalism, in Origins of the Federal Judiciary: Essays
on the Judiciary Act of 1789 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1992).
197. Congress had revised the jurisdictional statute, possibly in an effort to get the Court
to review such questions. See Richard A. Matasar & Gregory S. Bruch, Procedural Common
Law, Federal Jurisdictional Policy, and Abandonment of the Adequate and Independent
State Grounds Doctrine, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 1291, 1319 (1986) (“After the Civil War,
Congress had undertaken a broad-scale reordering of the relations between federal and
state governments . . . . Congress’ intent to give litigants a chance to avoid state courts was
evident . . . .”).
198. Murdock, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 629–33.
199. Id. at 620–25. Professor Michael Collins points out another important innovation
in Murdock: The Court determined that the state court’s opinion would henceforth comprise part of the record. See Michael G. Collins, Reconstructing Murdock v. Memphis, 98 Va.
L. Rev. 1439, 1447–48 (2012).
200. Murdock, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 596–97.
201. Id. at 596.
202. Id. at 597.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 597–99.
205. Id. at 598.
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court for revision upon its merits . . . [and] therefore all the errors found
in a record . . . must be reviewed so far as they are essential to a correct
ﬁnal judgment on the whole case.”206
The majority disagreed but only in part.207 It began by noting the “two
principal methods known to English jurisprudence, and to the jurisprudence of the Federal courts, by which cases may be removed . . . for review.
These are the writ of error and the appeal.”208 The key difference, the
Court recognized, was that the latter “bring[s] up the whole case for reexamination on all the merits, whether of law or fact,” de novo.209 In contrast, the writ of error brings up all other cases, “but every controverted
question of fact is excluded from consideration, and only such errors as
this court can see that the inferior court committed, and not all of these,
can be the subject of this court’s corrective power.”210 Speciﬁcally, the
Court noted that some errors are immaterial, and sometimes judgment
can sufficiently rest on one question, obviating the need to answer another.211 The Court also noted that some errors may fall outside the Court’s
jurisdiction, notably those related to “motion[s] for a new trial, or to quash
an indictment, or for a continuance, or amendment of pleadings . . . .”212
The Court then went on to discuss the rules and regulations that attend a
writ of error.213
Murdock’s argument that the Court had an obligation to consider
everything before it was correct to a point. Where his petition erred was in
recognizing what was actually before the Court. The Court decided that
Murdock’s description of the office of a writ of error covered too much.214
The Court agreed that the writ of error required review of all legal questions within the Court’s jurisdiction.215 But the writ of error did not expand
appellate jurisdiction beyond its statutory or constitutional limits.216 Since
the Court found that Congress intended to remove state law questions
from the Court’s jurisdiction in cases like Murdock, the Court lacked

206. Id. at 620–21.
207. See id. at 621–22.
208. Id. at 621.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 621–22.
211. Id. at 623.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 623–24.
214. Id. at 621–22.
215. Id. at 623.
216. In its own words, “the effect of the writ [of error] and its function and purpose” is
to “transfer the case to the Supreme Court, and with it the record of the proceedings in the
court below.” Later, “[w]hen the court comes to consider the case . . . what it shall review,
and what it shall not, must depend upon the jurisdiction of the court in that class of cases
as ﬁxed by the law governing that jurisdiction.” Id.
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jurisdiction.217
For the Murdock Court, there is little discretion under the writ of error: “When the court comes to consider the case . . . what it shall review,
and what it shall not, must depend upon the jurisdiction of the court in
that class of cases as ﬁxed by the law governing that jurisdiction.”218 The
“shall” language is notable and strong. The Court’s obligation extends to
all matters—but only those matters—that fall within its jurisdiction as provided for in the statutes.219 Conspicuously absent is any hint that the Court
has any control over the limits of its review.
III. THE EVARTS ACT AND EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY PRACTICE
The fundamental structure of the federal judiciary in general and the
Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction in particular remained relatively
unchanged until the close of the nineteenth century.220 While civil rights
legislation and the introduction of federal question jurisdiction transformed the functions of Article III courts, the organization of the judiciary
and the statutes governing the Court’s appellate jurisdiction went largely
unreformed.221 Reconstruction and the ascendant Republican Party’s increasing concern with economic development and business interests, however, ﬁnally led to a change.222
The Evarts Act of 1891 kicked off an era of tinkering with the Supreme
Court’s jurisdiction that culminated in the Judges’ Bill of 1925.223 The former introduced discretionary jurisdiction through certiorari, and the latter vastly expanded this power.224 Both statutes, however, made explicit the
traditional common law understanding of certiorari: Cases taken through
certiorari proceeded as if on a writ of error or appeal.
This Part discusses the impact of the Evarts Act, which for the ﬁrst
time gave the Court a statutory power of certiorari to select some cases for
review. It also provides a novel account of the Court’s slow—and likely accidental—transition from recognizing an independent obligation to review the entire record to limiting review to the questions presented by the
parties. This was a necessary ﬁrst step in the move to taking up the power
to select its own questions.
217. Id. at 621–22.
218. Id. at 623.
219. A note of caution is in order. This is, so far as I know, the ﬁrst attempt at a general
history of the Court’s appellate practices. It is not an attempt at a deﬁnitive history. The
conclusions are consistent with the leading cases and authorities, but an exhaustive study of
the period is beyond the scope of this Essay.
220. See infra section III.A.
221. See infra section III.A.
222. See infra section III.A.
223. See infra section III.B.
224. See infra section IV.A.
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The Evarts Act’s Effects on the Court’s Appellate Jurisdiction

Republican reforms after the Civil War led to a massive increase in the
workload of the federal courts. Congress contributed to the growth in federal litigation through statutes such as the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867225
and the Jurisdiction and Removal Act of 1875.226 This latter piece of legislation ﬁnally provided for federal question jurisdiction and brought a vast
array of cases into federal courts.227 Admiralty cases, railroad litigation, and
bankruptcy proceedings crowded the dockets as congressional
Republicans looked to the federal courts to help facilitate the party’s
emphasis on national economic development.228
The federal judiciary—and especially the Supreme Court—strained
under the new load. The structure of the judiciary was largely unchanged
from 1789.229 The district courts were exclusively, and circuit courts were
largely, trial courts. Litigants enjoyed an automatic right to appeal, and
since there was no dedicated appellate court, most appeals went directly
to the Supreme Court itself.230 The result was an explosion in the Court’s
workload. In 1860, the Court had 310 cases on its docket.231 In 1890, it had
1,816 cases, after including the 623 ﬁled in that year and was three years
behind on its work.232 Adding to the burden on the Justices, they were still
required to ride circuit, which often meant crossing the country (now
much larger than it had been in 1802) to serve as trial judges on circuit
courts. The crushing workload drove Chief Justice Morrison Waite into an
early grave.233
Congress addressed these problems through the Circuit Courts of
Appeals Act of 1891.234 Known as the Evarts Act, the legislation created the
circuit courts of appeals, providing the federal judicial structure known
today. For present purposes, the most relevant part of the Evarts Act was
the reorganization of the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction. It
transformed the Court’s workload in two ways. First, fewer litigants could

225. Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, Pub. L. No. 39-28, 14 Stat. 385.
226. Jurisdiction and Removal Act of 1875, Pub. L. No. 43-137, 18 Stat. 470. Tara Leigh
Grove attributes most of the expansion of the Court’s docket to this Act. Grove, Exceptions
Clause, supra note 61, at 951.
227. Jurisdiction and Removal Act of 1875 § 1, 18 Stat. at 470.
228. Crowe, supra note 41, at 173–75.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. See Russell R. Wheeler & Cynthia Harrison, Creating the Federal Judicial System
16 (2005) (citing Frankfurter & Landis, Business of the Supreme Court: A Study, supra note
41, at 101–02).
232. Id.; see also Hartnett, supra note 2, at 1650.
233. See Peter Charles Hoffer, Williamjames Hull Hoffer & N. E. H. Hull, The Federal
Courts: An Essential History 200 (2016).
234. Judiciary Act of 1891, Pub. L. No. 51-517, § 6, 26 Stat. 826, 828.
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directly appeal to the Court.235 Congress channeled diversity cases and all
criminal matters to the new circuit courts of appeals, and those decisions
were made ﬁnal. This removed a large set of appeals from the Court’s mandatory jurisdiction. Second, it maintained the Court’s ability to enforce
and unify federal law through certiﬁcation or certiorari. The Act thus reduced the number of cases the Court had to decide but not the number
of cases it might decide.
1. Appellate Jurisdiction Under the Evarts Act. — The Evarts Act allocated the Court’s appellate jurisdiction across three distinct avenues that
were not entirely mutually exclusive. The primary pathway to Supreme
Court review was through section ﬁve, which gave the Court mandatory
jurisdiction over a deﬁned set of cases. It provided for direct review of the
district courts in some cases236 and review of the circuit courts of appeals
in others.237 It also required that “[i]n any case in which the jurisdiction
of the court is in issue . . . the question of jurisdiction alone shall be certiﬁed to the Supreme Court from the court below for decision.”238
Section ﬁve’s limitations teach important lessons. First, Congress was
entirely capable of channeling particular types of cases to the Court using
the writ of error. Second, Congress was willing and able to direct particular
questions to the Court without any input from the Justices. Third, this
question-speciﬁc review of questions was accomplished through certiﬁcation of the question itself rather than through certiorari. Finally, the Court
itself had no power to expand or contract its jurisdiction on appeal. Consistent with Article III, Congress created the exceptions and regulations
through statute.
The second avenue to appellate review at the Supreme Court was certiﬁcation of particular questions by the new circuit courts of appeals.239 In
any case before the circuit courts, circuit judges had the option to certify

235. See Crowe, supra note 41, at 185.
236. Judiciary Act of 1891, Pub. L. No. 51-517, § 5, 26 Stat. at 827–28. There were ﬁve
types of cases that went straight from the trial court to the Supreme Court. These consisted
of cases involving “ﬁnal sentences and decrees in prize causes,” capital convictions, cases of
constitutional construction, cases that drew the constitutionality of a federal statute or treaty
into question, and cases where the constitutionality of a state law or state constitution was at
issue. Id.
237. The courts of appeals were ﬁnal in diversity, admiralty, and criminal cases, along
with cases arising under patent and revenue laws. In other cases, the Court had mandatory
review, subject to a $1,000 amount in controversy requirement. Id.
238. Id.
239. Starting in 1802, Congress permitted circuit courts to certify questions to the
Supreme Court. Judiciary Act of 1802, Pub. L. No. 7-31, § 6, 2 Stat. 156, 159–61. When the
circuit court was divided on a question, it could send that discrete question to the Supreme
Court and await instructions. Id. Certiﬁcation was only available from circuit courts—not
from state courts—a distinction that remains to the present time. See id. (making reference
to circuit courts only); Sup. Ct. R. 19.1.
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questions to the Supreme Court.240 When a question was certiﬁed, the
Court had the option of either answering the question or requiring the
lower court to send the entire case up to the Court for review.241
The differences between this form of certiﬁcation and that from section ﬁve of the Evarts Act are apparent. Certiﬁcation of the jurisdictional
question from the district court was mandatory, and the Supreme Court
could not require the entire case be brought up.242 Its jurisdiction was limited to the question itself. In contrast, certiﬁcation of questions from the
circuit courts was in the discretion of the lower court judges, and the
Supreme Court had the option of deciding the speciﬁed question or the
entire case.243
The similarities between the two are also clear. Congress never gave
the Court discretion to narrow review to particular questions.244 Certiﬁcation was in the hands of the litigants (section ﬁve) or the circuit court
judges. In addition, the language is consistent: Certiﬁcation is the tool that
limits jurisdiction to particular questions.
For cases ﬂowing through the new courts of appeals, Congress believed that the question-certiﬁcation procedure would be the primary
method for bringing important issues to the Court for resolution.245 But
Congress had some worry that the circuit courts might not always certify
questions that should be resolved by the Supreme Court.246 Congress
wanted the new circuit courts to serve as a ﬁlter between the district courts
and the Supreme Court.247 It did not want these new courts to be able to
avoid review by shirking their duty to certify questions when necessary. Accordingly, it gave the Court an independent power to bring cases before
the Justices: certiorari.248 Certiorari was intended “as a sort of fallback pro-

240. Judiciary Act of 1891 § 6, 26 Stat. at 826, 828.
241. Id.
242. Id. § 5, 26 Stat. at 827–28.
243. Id. § 6, 26 Stat. at 828.
244. See id. §§ 5–6, 26 Stat. at 827–28.
245. See Hartnett, supra note 2, at 1656.
246. After Evarts introduced the certiﬁcation provision to the Senate, he added,
“[A]nother guard against . . . a careless or inadvertent disposition of important litigation by
these courts; . . . there should be something besides a mere judgement within these courts
as to what ought to be reviewed in the interest of jurisprudence and uniformity of decision . . . .” See 21 Cong. Rec. 10,222 (1890) (statement of Sen. William M. Evarts).
247. Thus, the new circuit courts of appeals found themselves stuck in the middle. See
John Fabian Witt, Introduction: Constraint, Authority, and the Rule of Law in a Federal
Circuit Court of Appeals, 85 Fordham L. Rev. 3, 3 (2016).
248. Evarts clearly described certiorari as the “guard” against “diversity of judgements”
or the failure of the Court to certify a question. His statement before the Senate continued:
[T]he Supreme Court shall have a right, in any of these cases that are thus
made ﬁnal, by certiorari to take up to itself for ﬁnal determination . . . and
in that way the scheme of the [Senate Judiciary] committee does ﬁrmly
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vision should the circuit courts of appeals prove, on occasion, to be surprisingly careless in deciding cases or issuing certiﬁcates.”249
Given its historical origins, certiorari was the natural device to use, but
it constituted a signiﬁcant break from the Court’s previous certiorari practice. In the past, the Court had used the writ of certiorari exclusively as an
auxiliary device to bring up the entire record of a case already within the
Court’s jurisdiction.250 The new statute left it to the Court to use certiorari
to reach out and take jurisdiction of a case in addition to the record.251
This was a traditional use of the writ at common law and in some states,252
but the use of certiorari as an ordinary device to bring up cases for review
was new for the Supreme Court.253
That said, the statute was careful to track the common law contours
of certiorari. As the Court itself had noted previously, when certiorari was
the vehicle used to bring about appellate review, the reviewing court would
proceed as it would under a writ of error.254 This common law understanding was made explicit in the Evarts Act. Certiorari to the circuit court
and peremptorily make a ﬁnalty on such subjects . . . and at the same time
leaves ﬂexibility, elasticity, and openness for supervision by the Supreme
Court.
See 21 Cong. Rec. 10,222 (1890) (statement of Sen. William M. Evarts). It is worth noting
that certiorari was not included in the House version of the bill but added by Evarts when
the bill was in the Senate Judiciary Committee. Before writing his version of the bill, Evarts
submitted a memorandum of the proposed measures with a general plan to “the Justices of
the Supreme Court and one or two judges of the Circuit Court, inviting criticism and suggestion.” William Maxwell Evarts, Arguments and Speeches of William Maxwell Evarts 324
(Sherman Evarts ed., 1919). After receiving responses indicating “the general approval of
the members of the bench,” Evarts dictated what became the Judiciary Act of 1891 to his
secretary. See id. at 324–25. It is unclear if Evarts’s proposal initially included certiorari or
if a member of the bench recommended its inclusion in the ﬁnal version of the bill. Regardless, in an interview before passage of the bill, Evarts speciﬁcally identiﬁed the seemingly
simple change of including certiorari as a principal feature which distinguished his bill from
the version that had already passed the House. Mr. Evarts on His New Law, N.Y. Trib., March
8, 1891, at 5.
249. Hartnett, supra note 2, at 1656; see also Am. Constr. Co. v. Jacksonville, Tampa &
Key W. Ry. Co., 148 U.S. 372, 383–84 (1893) (noting that the Court had only granted certiorari in two important questions and only because the courts of appeals “had declined to
certify the question[s]”).
250. See Am. Constr. Co., 148 U.S. at 380; see also Hodges v. Vaughan, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.)
12, 13 (1873) (“A motion for certiorari is founded upon a suggestion of diminution, and is
designed to bring up some part of the record left back and not included in the transcript.”).
251. See Judiciary Act of 1891, Pub. L. No. 51-517, § 6, 26 Stat. 826, 828.
252. See Harris v. Barber, 129 U.S. 366, 369 (1889) (collecting cases).
253. See Fallon et al., supra note 75, at 30 (“[T]he Evarts Act introduced the then revolutionary, but now familiar, principle of discretionary review of federal judgments on writ
of certiorari.”).
254. See Harris, 129 U.S. at 369. As the Court noted in Harris:
A writ of certiorari, when its object is not to remove a case before trial, or
to supply defects in a record, but to bring up after judgment the proceedings of an inferior court or tribunal, whose procedure is not according to
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would compel the lower court to “certif[y] to the Supreme Court for its
review and determination with the same power and authority in the case
as if it had been carried by appeal or writ of error to the Supreme
Court.”255 In this regard, Congress was merely stating the ordinary
consequences of using a writ of certiorari as an appellate device. When the
Court did issue a certiorari, it was “in the nature of a writ of error . . . [and]
when the writ [was] granted, and the record certiﬁed in obedience to it,
the questions arising upon that record must be determined according to
ﬁxed rules of law.”256 In essence, Supreme Court review of these cases was
not mandatory—certiorari is always discretionary—but once the Court
granted the writ, subsequent review was comprehensive. The Court
decided the case as if on a writ of error.
The Evarts Act made a clear distinction throughout between cases—
reviewed on appeal, error, or certiorari—and questions, which were to be
reviewed on certiﬁcation. These distinctions remain in the statutes to the
present time. Section ﬁve of the Act, which governed direct review of certain district court actions on appeals or writs of error, included one additional category to those mentioned above.257 What set certiﬁcation under
section ﬁve apart from ordinary certiﬁcation was (1) that the question was
certiﬁed directly from the district court, and (2) that the lower court did
not have discretion as to whether to certify the question.258 Section ﬁve
demonstrates Congress could and would direct particular questions—instead of entire cases—to the Court if it thought it wise. What is more,
Congress had a consistent language to handle such matters. Review of a
question was handled through certiﬁcation of the question.

the course of the common law, is in the nature of a writ of error. Although
the granting of the writ of certiorari rests in the discretion of the court,
yet after the writ has been granted, and the record certiﬁed in obedience
to it, the questions arising upon that record must be determined according to ﬁxed rules of law, and their determination is reviewable on error.
Id.
255. Judiciary Act of 1891 § 6, 26 Stat. at 828.
256. Am. Constr. Co. v. Jacksonville, Tampa & Key W. Ry. Co., 148 U.S. 372, 387 (1893)
(citing Harris, 129 U.S. at 369). Harris seems to suggest that certiorari only allows the superior court to inquire into jurisdiction. See Harris, 129 U.S. at 371–72 (“Certiorari goes only
to the jurisdiction. It does not go to any errors of judgment that may have been committed
by the justice [of the peace] in the progress of the exercise of that jurisdiction.” (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Barber v. Harris, 17 D.C. (6 Mackey) 586, 595 (1888))).
To the extent common law certiorari prior to 1891 was actually limited to jurisdiction when
used as an appellate device, that limitation did not apply to statutory certiorari, which speciﬁed that certiorari caused the case to go to the Court “as if it had been carried by appeal
or writ of error to the Supreme Court.” See Judiciary Act of 1891 § 6, 26 Stat. at 828.
257. See Judiciary Act of 1891 § 5, 26 Stat. at 827–28.
258. See id.
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Developments From 1891 Through 1925

The Evarts Act provided the architecture for the Court’s appellate jurisdiction going forward. Henceforth, there were three paths to appellate
review: mandatory review of cases, discretionary review of cases through
certiorari, or review of particular questions through certiﬁcation.259
Congress, through statute, reassigned various types of cases to different
paths, but these three alternative pathways remained largely unaltered.
What has changed over time are the sets of cases assigned to each
alternative. For instance, in 1914 and 1916, Congress added review of
certain state court decisions to the set of cases reviewable through
certiorari.260
In addition to these congressional changes, the Court also altered its
certiorari jurisdiction in the years following the Evarts Act. Speciﬁcally, it
began using common law writs of certiorari to take cases. While the Court
always had certiorari power under the All Writs Act provision of the
Judiciary Act of 1789,261 it had never used certiorari to take jurisdiction of
a case on appeal.262 After the Evarts Act, the Court occasionally used certiorari for cases that did not ﬁt into categories speciﬁed in the reorganization
of the Court’s jurisdiction.263 When a lower court “acted without jurisdiction, or in disregard of statutory provisions,” the Court “resorted to [certiorari] from necessity to afford a remedy where there would otherwise have
been a denial of justice.”264 For instance, in Ex parte Chetwood, the Court
found that the circuit court had exceeded its jurisdiction and allowed certiorari because a writ of error was not available.265 Similarly, in McClellan v.
Carland, the Court used certiorari to review an interlocutory appeal that
did not fall within the parameters of certiorari under the Evarts Act.266
259. See id. The Court retained the option of ordering the entire case up for review
when a question was certiﬁed. Id. § 6, 26 Stat. at 828.
260. Act of Sept. 6, 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-258, sec. 2, § 237, 39 Stat. 726, 726–27; Act of
Dec. 23, 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-224, 38 Stat. 790 (codiﬁed as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1257
(1994)). Prior to 1914, it was settled law that the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear cases from
state courts when the judgment below upheld the federal claim. Arthur D. Hellman, Lauren
K. Robel & David R. Stras, Federal Courts: Cases and Materials on Judicial Federalism and
the Lawyering Process 1187 (2d ed. 2009).
261. Judiciary Act of 1789, Pub. L. No. 1-20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81–82 (codiﬁed as amended
at 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1994)).
262. See Am. Constr. Co. v. Jacksonville, Tampa & Key W. Ry. Co., 148 U.S. 372, 380
(1893).
263. See infra note 275 and accompanying text.
264. Degge v. Hitchcock, 229 U.S. 162, 170 (1913).
265. 165 U.S. 443, 461–62 (1897). Interestingly, the Court concludes by saying, “We
presume, after what we have said, it will not be necessary for the writ to issue.” Id. at 462.
266. 217 U.S. 268, 278–79 (1910); see also Pfander, Jurisdiction-Stripping, supra note
125, at 1493 & n.269 (citing McClellan as an example of the Court “securing discretionary
review of actions of inferior federal tribunals” by “issuing common law certiorari . . . because
statutory certiorari was unavailable”). An interesting question is why the Court did not use
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Aside from this development, the striking feature of the Court’s cases
in the wake of the Evarts Act is how little changed about the Court’s role
in the cases it decided. For one thing, it rarely used certiorari,267 and when
it did, it primarily acted as Congress intended: It took cases when the circuit courts of appeals neglected to certify important questions.268 But when
the Court took a case on certiorari, it reviewed the entire case, not just the
important question.269
Indeed, the Court explicitly reaffirmed that certiorari did nothing to
amend the Court’s obligations when deciding a case as if on error or appeal. In one of its ﬁrst cases interpreting the Act, the Court affirmed that
“‘appeals or writs of error,’ must be understood within the meaning of
those terms as used in all prior acts of Congress relating to the appellate
powers of this court.”270 The Court was explicit that, in appeals, “[A] case
cannot be brought to this court in fragments.”271 Even more to the point,
the Court declared, “From the very foundation of our judicial system the
object and policy of the acts of Congress in relation to appeals and writs of
error . . . have been . . . to have the whole case and every matter in controversy in it decided in a single appeal.”272
certiorari in similar cases before the Evarts Act. It seems that once Congress opened the
door to use certiorari to take jurisdiction of some cases, the Court discovered some preexisting power to use certiorari to reach areas Congress did not specify as appropriate for
certiorari jurisdiction. This raises an interesting question about the Court’s power: Was the
use of certiorari in these and similar cases appropriate? An originalist view would ﬁnd ﬁrmly
in the affirmative, as the 1789 statute plainly intended to incorporate the common law powers of the writ. But because the Court’s regular, established, and publicly stated use of the
writ was explicitly conﬁned to certiorari as an auxiliary process, considerations of precedent
and concerns for America’s unique legal development—to say nothing of the value of consistency and predictability—would counsel that the Court erred.
267. For instance, two years after the passage of the Evarts Act, the Court noted that its
certiorari power “should be exercised sparingly and with great caution.” Am. Constr. Co., 148
U.S. at 383. It noted that “while there have been many applications to this court for writs of
certiorari . . . two only have been granted . . . and in each of those cases the circuit court of
appeals had declined to certify the question to this court.” Id. at 383–84.
268. Id. Circuit courts were admonished to exercise their unilateral power to certify
questions of sufficient “gravity and importance.” In re Lau Ow Bew, 141 U.S. 583, 586–87
(1891).
269. See In re Lau Ow Bew, 141 U.S. at 587 (“[A]ny case in which the judgment of the
circuit court of appeals is made ﬁnal may be required by this court, by certiorari or otherwise,
to be certiﬁed to it for review and determination, as if it had been brought here on appeal
or writ of error.” (emphasis added)).
270. McLish v. Roff, 141 U.S. 661, 665 (1891). Another interesting passage of McLish is
worth noting. The dispute in the case was whether the question of jurisdiction could be
appealed before the Court entered ﬁnal judgment. Id. at 664. In deciding it could not, the
Court noted that, if Congress had intended to change a fundamental requirement of the
writ of error or the appeal, it “would have been indicated in express and explicit terms.” Id.
at 667.
271. Id. at 665.
272. Id. at 665–66. The major issue for the Court was not whether it could narrow its
focus to questions. Instead, the chief problem was whether the Court could grant certiorari
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Put differently, the Court still viewed its job as deciding entire cases as
if on writs of error or appeal.273 The Court continued to exercise its obligation to review the entire record for error even if the record or testimony
was extensive.274 And questions the Court explicitly noted were not worth
its time were still reviewed because they were part of the case.275
*

*

*

The most signiﬁcant change during this era was the Court’s quiet—
and perhaps accidental—limitation of review to the questions mentioned
in the assignment of error. This was a seemingly small shift, but it was an
early ﬁrst step on the Court’s path toward narrowing certiorari jurisdiction
to questions instead of cases. The story begins in 1898 in a case called
Hubbard v. Tod.276 The facts of the case are not important, but the
before a circuit court entered ﬁnal judgment. The Court decided that the Evarts Act gave
the Court “a comprehensive and unlimited power” to transfer cases from the circuit courts
to itself for review. Forsyth v. City of Hammond, 166 U.S. 506, 513 (1897). Even when deploying such grandiose language, however, the Court never presumed it could do anything
but take the entire case. Id. at 513–14.
273. See supra note 269 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Dickinson,
213 U.S. 92, 98 (1909) (quoting Judiciary Act of 1891, Pub. L. No. 51-517, § 6, 26 Stat. 826,
828).
274. See, e.g., Adams v. Cowen, 177 U.S. 471, 482 (1900).
275. Crossman v. Burrill, 179 U.S. 100, 115 (1900) (“[Q]uestions of payment . . . are
pure questions of fact, . . . [and] had they been the only questions presented by the record,
a writ of certiorari would not have been granted; . . . [the questions] appear to this court . . .
to have been rightly decided by the circuit court of appeals . . . .”); see also Cal. Reduction
Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works, 199 U.S. 306, 325 (1905) (“Other questions have been
discussed by counsel, but they do not require special notice at our hands. We are content
with the disposition made of them in the courts below.”).
That said, the Court felt free not to write about particular questions—especially factladen questions—if the circuit court had written extensively on the matter and the Court
was satisﬁed with its description and conclusions. See, e.g., Farmers’ Loan & Tr. Co. v. Penn
Plate Glass Co., 186 U.S. 434, 457–58 (1902); Adams, 177 U.S. at 482. An interesting example
is Moffett, Hodgkins & Clarke Co. v. Rochester, 178 U.S. 373, 387–88 (1900). The lower
courts had each reached a common conclusion about a contract at issue in the case. The
Court notes that it “usually accepts such concurrence as conclusive,” but in this case, it went
on to disagree with the lower courts. Id. at 387. The Court was paying close attention to the
record even in questions in which it usually treated the lower court decision as conclusive.
Further, the Court continued its longstanding practice of treating agreement between
the lower courts on an issue of fact as conclusive in equity and admiralty cases. See, e.g.,
Workman v. City of New York, 179 U.S. 552, 555 (1900) (recognizing “the well-settled doctrine that where both courts below have concurred in a ﬁnding of fact, it will, in this court,
be accepted as conclusive, unless it affirmatively appears that the lower courts obviously
erred”). Even here, however, the Court did not accept factual ﬁndings blindly. The Justices
still examined the record to make sure such factual determinations were justiﬁed. See, e.g.,
id. (explaining that “the testimony” on the record “would not justify the assertion” “that
both the courts below had manifestly erred in their appreciation of the facts”); Moffett,
Hodgkins & Clarke Co., 178 U.S. at 387–88.
276. 171 U.S. 474 (1898). It arguably began two years earlier in Saltonstall v. Birtwell,
164 U.S. 54 (1896). Joseph Birtwell sued the customs collector in Boston to recover duties
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procedural history is. By statute, the Eighth Circuit’s decision in the case
was ﬁnal, but the Court could take the case through certiorari.277 The
Court did so, and in the course of deciding the case, it ﬁrst noted that the
case, “having been brought up by certiorari on the application of
petitioner below, is pending before us as if on his appeal.”278 Next, it
mentioned in passing that, “as respondents did not apply for certiorari, we
shall conﬁne our consideration of the case to the examination of errors
assigned by petitioner.”279 Essentially, the Court was noting that there was
no cross-appeal in this case, so it was only addressing the record on behalf
of the party that had, through certiorari, effectively obtained an appeal.280
There is no indication that this breezy aside was meant to upend the
traditional understanding that the Court would examine the entire record
for error in cases coming before the Justices on a writ of error.281 Indeed,
the Court continued to insist, in a series of cases from 1910 to 1915, that it
was “not limited to a consideration of the points presented by the plaintiff.”282 Instead, “the entire record is before [the Court], with power to
decide the case as it was presented to the Circuit Court of Appeals.”283 Further, the Court explicitly extended this understanding of the writ in the
context of certiorari.284
that had been overcharged. Id. at 65. The government agreed that Birtwell had been overcharged but argued he did not protest in time. Id. Birtwell prevailed at trial, during which
the judge made some special ﬁndings in favor of Birtwell. Id. at 66. The government appealed the timing question to the First Circuit Court of Appeals, but it did not assign error
to the special ﬁndings. See Saltonstall v. Birtwell, 66 F. 969, 970 (1st Cir. 1895). Birtwell
prevailed on the initial appeal, and the government petitioned for certiorari. See Saltonstall,
164 U.S. at 65. Once again, it argued the timing question, but the Solicitor General raised
the special ﬁndings in the petition and again in the merits brief. See Brief for Plaintiffs in
Error at 11, Saltonstall, 164 U.S. 54 (No. 588).
Affirming the judgment below, the Court refused to consider whether the circuit court
had committed error “as a matter of practice” in directing judgment based on special ﬁndings. Saltonstall, 164 U.S. at 70. Instead, it noted that “[n]o such error was assigned in the
circuit court, or was considered in the court of appeals.” Id. The petitioner assigned this
error for the ﬁrst time in the application for certiorari, and the Court implicitly decided the
claim was waived. Id. The Court’s opinion provides no authority justifying its refusal. Interestingly, Saltonstall predates both Hubbard and Alice State Bank. See Alice State Bank v. Hous.
Pasture Co., 247 U.S. 240 (1918); Hubbard, 171 U.S. 474; Saltonstall, 164 U.S 54. Neither
case, however, cites Saltonstall as authority to deviate from the traditional requirement to
review the entire record. See Alice State Bank, 247 U.S. 240; Hubbard, 171 U.S. 474.
277. See Hubbard, 171 U.S. at 494.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. The Court said as much about Hubbard in Montana Mining Co. v. St. Louis Mining
& Milling Co. of Montana, 186 U.S. 24, 31 (1902).
281. See, e.g., Garland v. Davis, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 131, 143 (1846).
282. Baker v. Warner, 231 U.S. 588, 593 (1913).
283. Lutcher & Moore Lumber Co. v. Knight, 217 U.S. 257, 267 (1910).
284. See id.; see also Delk v. St. Louis & S.F. R.R. Co., 220 U.S. 580, 588–89 (1911) (“As
the case is here upon certiorari . . . this court has the entire record before it, with the power

2022]

SUPREME COURT QUESTION SELECTION

833

In 1918, the Court granted certiorari in Alice State Bank v. Houston Pasture Co.285 The case involved an ownership dispute over 1,280 acres of land
granted to General Sam Houston by the Republic of Texas.286 Houston’s
executor passed the title to Colman, Mathis, and Fulton, who apparently
lived on the 1,280 acres until they transferred the title to Alice State Bank
in 1914.287 The 1918 case resulted from a dispute over the ownership of
the land, which was also claimed by the Houston Pasture Company.288
Complicating matters, an 1870 Texas statute “declared that a land certiﬁcate for 1,280 acres theretofore issued to General Sam Houston for military services was a ‘just claim from its original date’ and authorized the
issue of a ‘patent on the same, in the name of the heirs of General Sam
Houston, deceased.’”289
Alice State Bank argued that, even if the statutory grant was invalid,
the heirs had obtained the title through adverse possession.290 Evidence
showed that the heirs had paid taxes on, grazed cattle on, and excluded
others from the land.291 The district court disallowed the adverse possession defense because the land was fenced on only three sides.292 The fourth
side of the land was bounded by the Nueces Bay, which the trial judge ruled
was insufficient to start the statute of limitations running.293 The Supreme
Court reversed and sent the case back down for a new trial, ﬁnding for the
bank that water could be a sufficient barrier for an adverse possession
claim, thus starting the statute of limitations clock.294
In the third paragraph of an otherwise insigniﬁcant four-paragraph
opinion, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes offered the bank some advice.295
He asserted that there was a “plausible argument” that the bank could
have won on alternative grounds given the materials in the record.296 Citing Hubbard, Holmes went on to say that “as that is not the ground upon
which the writ of certiorari was asked or granted we conﬁne our discussion
to the matter relied upon in asking the intervention of this Court.”297 From

to review the action of that court, as well as direct such disposition of the case as that court
might have done . . . .”).
285. 247 U.S. 240 (1918).
286. Id. at 241.
287. Id. at 241–42.
288. See id. at 241.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 242.
291. Id.
292. See id.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 242–43.
295. Id. at 242.
296. Id.
297. Id.
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there, he moved on to describe the adverse possession claim that the Court
found persuasive.298
Holmes’s opinion in Alice State Bank did not itself deviate from traditional practice; it decided a sufficient set of questions to justify its judgment.299 When the Court can conceivably reverse on multiple grounds,
there is no obligation to review every question.300 The Court has the obligation to decide the case, and if it can do that by reversing on question
one before considering question two, it is free to do so.301 Of course, it
might be beneﬁcial for the Court to signal its views on other questions to
help lower courts decide the case on remand,302 but such guidance, while
permissible, is not necessary to fulﬁll the obligation to render judgment.
Further, in cases like Alice State Bank, there might be prudential reasons to
focus review on the speciﬁed questions. If the Court could reverse on either an asked question or an unasked question, perhaps it should respect
the parties’ wishes and focus on the presented issue.303 And in Alice State
Bank, the unasked, alternative ground dealt with the interpretation of a
state statute, so perhaps it was more appropriate for the Court to focus on
the issue of general interest—adverse possession—instead of focusing on
a federal interpretation of a Texas statute.304
Though Holmes’s opinion was thus consistent with traditional writ of
error practice, his brief aside into the potential dispositive issue of the effects of the Texas statute allowed him to quietly change the Court’s practice regarding review of cases from federal courts. In the past, the Court
had an independent obligation to examine the whole record in cases on a
writ of error to a lower federal court.305 But now, even if the Court noted
an error in the record, it felt free to pass it by if the plaintiff-in-error had
not raised it.306 After Alice State Bank, the Court did not always feel
298. Id.
299. See id. at 242–43; supra notes 64–71 and accompanying text.
300. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 374–75 (2010)
(Roberts, C.J., concurring) (discussing the Court’s practice of avoiding broad constitutional
questions when there is a valid narrower ground of decision).
301. See supra notes 68–71 and accompanying text.
302. But see Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 405–06 (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that
the majority “transgressed yet another ‘cardinal’ principle of the judicial process: ‘[I]f it is
not necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to decide more.’” (alteration in original)
(quoting PDK Labs. Inc. v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Roberts,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment))).
303. See Oldfather, supra note 68, at 166 (explaining that adjudicating the presented
issues is appropriate since “those claims represent the parties’ conceptualization of the speciﬁc dispute . . . and thus stand as strong evidence of the legally signiﬁcant facts that ought
to anchor the court’s reasoning”).
304. Alice State Bank, 247 U.S. at 242.
305. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
306. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Pac. States Paper Trade Ass’n., 273 U.S. 52, 66
(1927) (stating that the Court would not decide certain issues that the respondents failed
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compelled to review the full record for errors; it just looked at the
questions included in the assignment of error.307
IV. THE ERA OF GREAT DISCRETION
The ascension of William Howard Taft to the role of Chief Justice
kicked off perhaps the most transformative few years the Court has ever
known. Taft took his position and inherited a judiciary facing a great deal
of strain.308 Just as the Civil War and Reconstruction had expanded the
scope of federal law and overwhelmed the judiciary in the mid-nineteenth
century, the courts were again overworked at the sunset of the Progressive
Era, due in large part to World War I and Prohibition.309 The former
brought espionage cases and litigation pertaining to cancelled wartime
contracts.310 The latter brought not only the Volstead Act311 but also the
rise of organized crime and the pursuant federal response.312 Criminal
caseloads in the federal courts increased eight hundred percent, and the
to petition for certiorari on, despite respondents’ subsequent request for Court review of
those issues); Webster Elec. Co. v. Splitdorf Elec. Co., 264 U.S. 463, 464 (1924) (“[T]he
petition upon which the writ was granted challenged the decision below only in respect of
[one disputed] patent, and we are not called upon to consider the contentions now advanced as to the others.”).
307. See, e.g., Charles Warner Co. v. Indep. Pier Co., 278 U.S. 85, 91 (1928) (limiting
the Court’s review to questions in the assignment of error and citing Alice State Bank, 247
U.S. at 242, to support that action); Com. Credit Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 226, 229–30
(1928) (same); Steele v. Drummond, 275 U.S. 199, 203 (1927) (same).
308. See Frankfurter & Landis, Business of the Supreme Court: A Study, supra note 41,
at 258–59.
309. See Crowe, supra note 41, at 201.
310. Id. at 199.
311. National Prohibition (Volstead) Act, Pub. L. No. 66-66, 41 Stat. 305 (1919) (codiﬁed at 27 U.S.C. §§ 1–5 (1925) (repealed 1933)).
312. See Crowe, supra note 41, at 199. Taft traced a longer list of the sources of judicial
overwork in a speech to the Chicago Bar Association in 1921:
Dormant powers of the Federal Government under the Constitution have
been made active, and the Federal Government has poked its nose into a
great many ﬁelds where it was not known before, for lack of Congressional
initiation. In the ﬁrst place, the giving to the Federal trial courts jurisdiction of suits involving federal questions without regard to citizenship was
one addition. Then the enactment of the Interstate Commerce law and
the casting upon Federal Courts the revisory power over the action of the
Interstate Commerce Commission was another. Then, the Anti Trust Law,
the Railroad Safety Appliance Law, the Adamson Law, the Federal Trade
Commission Law, the Clayton Act, the Federal Employers’ Liability Law,
the Pure Food Law, the Narcotic Law, the White Slave Law and other acts,
and ﬁnally the Eighteenth Amendment and the Volstead Act, have expanded the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the Federal Courts of ﬁrst
instance to such an extent that unless something is done, they are likely
to be swamped, and delay is a denial of justice.
William Howard Taft, Three Needed Steps of Progress, 8 ABA J. 34, 34 (1922).
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number of certiorari petitions awaiting the Court’s review effectively doubled from 270 to 539.313
Taft arrived at the Court with a preexisting interest in judicial reform.
While serving previously as president of the American Bar Association, Taft
had pushed for judicial reforms.314 As Chief Justice, he marshalled the bar
to continue the campaign. Taft was a “crackerjack administrator” with a
keen interest in making the judiciary more efficient from top to bottom.315
His ﬁrst victory was the Judicial Conference Act of 1922.316 The bill
created twenty-four new district court judges to help handle the growing
caseload.317 Second, it gave the Chief Justice the power to transfer district
judges between circuits so that those judges with excess capacity could be
assigned to help out in regions where the work was overwhelming the current complement of judges.318 Third, the bill established the Conference
of Senior Circuit Judges, which eventually became known as the Judicial
Conference.319 This annual meeting allowed the Chief Justice to convene
a gathering of the nation’s top judges, gather information, generate new
ideas, and make recommendations to Congress.320
His second victory was the Judges’ Bill of 1925.321 Citing the Court’s
ever-expanding workload, Taft and his colleagues pressed for an expansion
of the Court’s certiorari powers.322 This legislation codiﬁed Taft’s vision—
then new, now so entrenched that modern lawyers struggle to imagine an
alternative—that the Supreme Court should oversee the federal judiciary323 by focusing on cases that raised constitutional questions or divided
the lower courts.

313. Crowe, supra note 41, at 199 (citing Deborah J. Barrow, Gary Zuk, & Gerard S.
Gryski, The Federal Judiciary and Institutional Change 32 (1996); Frankfurter & Landis,
Business of the Supreme Court: A Study, supra note 41, at 295).
314. See Robert C. Post, Mr. Taft Becomes Chief Justice, 76 U. Cin. L. Rev. 761, 764 n.13
(2008) (noting that Taft advocated for reforms designed to reduce the delay in hearing and
deciding cases as well as the increasing costs of litigation).
315. Id. at 779–80 (quoting Charles Evans Hughes’s observation that the “efficient administration of justice was, after all, the dominant interest of his public life”).
316. Act of Sept. 14, 1922, Pub. L. No. 67-298, 42 Stat. 837.
317. Id. § 1, 42 Stat. at 837–38.
318. Id. § 3, 42 Stat. at 839.
319. Id. § 2, 42 Stat. at 838–39.
320. Id.
321. Judiciary Act of 1925, Pub. L. No. 68-415, sec. 1, § 239, 43 Stat. 936, 937–38.
322. See Jurisdiction of Circuit Courts of Appeals and the Supreme Court of the United
States: Hearing on H.R. 8206 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 10, 19–20,
24, 28 (1924) (statements of Willis Van Devanter, J., James C. McReynolds, J., George Sutherland, J. & William H. Taft, C.J.).
323. Robert Post, The Supreme Court Opinion as Institutional Practice: Dissent, Legal
Scholarship, and Decisionmaking in the Taft Court, 85 Minn. L. Rev. 1267, 1271 (2001)
[hereinafter Post, Supreme Court Opinion as Institutional Practice].
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Over the decades, Congress would continue to expand the Court’s
discretion by expanding the types of cases the Court would hear through
certiorari. However, as this Part demonstrates, Congress never approved—
or even considered—the idea that the Court would focus on self-selected
questions. This Part begins by recounting the legislative history of the
Judges’ Bill and the Justices’ promise that certiorari review encompassed
the entire case. It next examines Olmstead v. United States, the case in which
the Court took for itself the power to select its own questions for review.324
The remainder of the Part traces subsequent twentieth-century statutory
changes to the Court’s appellate jurisdiction.
A.

The Judges’ Bill

The Judges’ Bill did not change the available forms of appellate review. Mandatory cases still came before the Court through writs of error
and appeals. Mandatory questions still came up through certiﬁcation.325
Similarly, the Judges’ Bill did not change the certiorari mechanism. As before, the Court could use certiorari “to require that there be certiﬁed to it
[from a state court] for review and determination, with the same power
and authority and with like effect as if brought up by writ of error, any
cause wherein a ﬁnal judgment . . . has been rendered.”326 In federal cases,
the Court could issue certiorari and proceed “with the same power and
authority, and with like effect, as if the cause had been brought there by
unrestricted writ of error or appeal.”327
The transformational nature of the Judges’ Bill was due not to any
procedural innovation but rather due to the shifting of large sets of cases
out of the Court’s mandatory jurisdiction. The Judges’ Bill dramatically
324. See 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (noting that the preceding discussion had resolved
“the only question that comes within the terms of our order granting certiorari” but proceeding to the merits of other claims rejected in the lower courts), overruled on other
grounds in part by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); infra section IV.B.
325. Judiciary Act of 1925 sec. 1, § 239, 43 Stat. at 938. As before, when a circuit court
of appeals certiﬁed “any questions or propositions of law concerning which instructions are
desired,” the Supreme Court could
either give binding instructions on the questions and propositions
certiﬁed or may require that the entire record in the cause be sent up for
its consideration, and thereupon shall decide the whole matter in
controversy in the same manner as if it had been brought there by writ of
error or appeal.
Id.
Under the Judges’ Bill, jurisdictional questions from district courts were no longer appealed directly to the Supreme Court; however, the language allowing circuit courts to certify questions and for the Supreme Court to force certiﬁcation of cases through certiorari
was essentially unchanged. See id. sec. 1, §§ 238–240, 43 Stat. at 938; see also Judicial Code
of 1911, Pub. L. No. 61-475, §§ 238–240, 36 Stat. 1087, 1157.
326. Judiciary Act of 1925 sec. 1, § 237(b), 43 Stat. at 937.
327. Id. sec. 1, § 240(a), 43 Stat. at 938–39. The notable change here was to refer to the
writ of error in federal cases as “unrestricted.”
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reduced the mandatory docket. It limited mandatory review of state decisions to cases where the state court (1) upheld a state statute or authority
against a challenge based on constitutional or federal law, or (2) struck
down a federal statute, treaty, or authority as unconstitutional.328 In federal
cases, the Court still had to take cases where a court of appeals struck down
a state statute329 and a few other speciﬁed types of cases directly from the
district courts.330 The remainder of the docket was made discretionary.
At the congressional hearings on the Judges’ Bill, the Justices consistently assumed that certiorari was simply a pathway to traditional review on
a writ of error.331 The ability of a “writ of error . . . improvidently sought”
to be “regarded and acted on as a petition for certiorari” in the ﬁnal bill332
demonstrated just how similarly the Justices believed the two writs functioned. While Taft testiﬁed in 1922 that a distinction between writs of error
and certiorari was “necessary to maintain,” he pointed out the writs functioned so similarly that, when a case was wrongly brought upon writ of error instead of certiorari, it should not be dismissed as the existing statutes
required.333 He argued the ability of the Court to consider a writ of error
wrongly sought “as an application for certiorari and acted upon as such”
was an important remedy provided by the proposed legislation and would
allow for the Court to hear additional cases.334 Justices James McReynolds
and Willis Van Devanter made the same argument two years later.335
McReynolds testiﬁed that, if counsel is unsure whether to apply for writ of
error or certiorari, they “can be perfectly safe by applying for a writ of
certiorari.”336 When Senator Selden Spencer sought to clarify
McReynolds’s point by asking, “[Counsel] can apply for a writ of error, and
if it is found that the writ of error was improvidently granted, then it is
treated as a petition for writ of certiorari?”337 Van Devanter conﬁrmed that
328. Id. sec. 1, § 237, 43 Stat. at 937–38.
329. Id. sec. 1, § 240(b), 43 Stat. at 939.
330. Id. sec. 1, § 238, 43 Stat. at 938.
331. See infra notes 333–343 and accompanying text.
332. Judiciary Act of 1925 sec. 1, § 237(c), 43 Stat. at 938.
333. Jurisdiction of Circuit Courts of Appeals and United States Supreme Court: Hearing on H.R. 10479 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 8 (1922).
334. Id. at 6. Taft went so far as to note that “some very wise lawyers have not only taken
out a writ of error but have also ﬁled a petition for the writ of certiorari, so that if they miss
on one they can catch it with the other.” Id.
335. See Jurisdiction of Circuit Courts of Appeals and of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearing on H.R. 8206, supra note 322, at 18–19 (statement of Willis Van
Devanter, J.); Procedure in Federal Courts: Hearing on S. 2060 and S. 2061 Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 36 (1924) (statement of James
McReynolds, J.).
336. Procedure in Federal Courts: Hearing on S. 2060 and S. 2061 Before a Subcomm.
of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 335, at 25, 36 (statement of James McReynolds,
J.).
337. Id. at 36 (statement of Sen. Selden Spencer).
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the proposed legislation intentionally provided this type of relief. Use of
the wrong writ “does not shut [counsel] out; the mistake is not fatal,” Van
Devanter reassured Spencer, because “[t]he bill has provisions at every
point which are intended to save people from mistakes in mere
procedure.”338
Van Devanter testiﬁed that granting certiorari, like granting a writ of
error, implied that the Justices all understood “that, in the entire environment of the case, it is one that should be argued at length before them, be
considered by them in the light of that presentation and then deliberately
decided.”339 He continued, “Granting the writ means, and only means,
that the court ﬁnds probable cause for a full consideration of the case in
ordinary course.”340 Indeed, Van Devanter expressly promised that
expanding the scope of certiorari would do nothing to adjust the Court’s
procedures.341 Justice McReynolds affirmed that certiorari meant the full
case should be “reheard upon its merits.”342 Taft and the other Justices
argued for broader discretionary powers in federal cases, especially since
certiorari jurisdiction “extend[ed] to the whole case and every question
presented in it.”343
After passage of the Judges’ Bill, the Court still recognized—at least
at ﬁrst—that review after granting certiorari required treating the case as
if it had appeared on a writ of error.344 But this recognition soon faded.
Before the end of the 1920s, the Court decided it had the power to limit
review on certiorari to questions.345 This transition was not embraced at
ﬁrst by all of the Justices.346 But any resistance on the Court quickly collapsed.
338. Id. at 37 (statement of Willis Van Devanter, J.).
339. James Craig Peacock, Purpose of Certiorari in Supreme Court Practice and Effect
of Denial or Allowance, 15 ABA J. 681, 684 (1929).
340. Id.
341. Consider Justice Van Devanter’s response to Senator Andrew J. Montague’s question in the House hearings. Montague asked Van Devanter, “Although you ask for discretionary power, you propose to exercise it in the method you have heretofore exercised it,”
to which Van Devanter replied, “Certainly. Of course, we could not maintain the institution
and make it accomplish its purpose unless we did, and there is no purpose to do anything
else.” See Jurisdiction of Circuit Courts of Appeals and of the Supreme Court, Hearing on
H.R. 8206, supra note 322, at 18.
342. See Procedure in Federal Courts: Hearing on S. 2060 and S. 2061 Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 335, at 30.
343. See 66 Cong. Rec. 2921 (1925) (reproducing Letter from William H. Taft, C.J., U.S.
Sup. Ct., to Royal S. Copeland, Sen., U.S. Senate (Dec. 31, 1924)).
344. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Pac. States Paper Trade Ass’n, 273 U.S. 52, 66 (1927) (“This
court has the same power and authority as if the case had been carried here by appeal or
writ of error.”).
345. See Md. Cas. Co. v. Jones, 278 U.S. 596, 596 (1928) (mem.); Olmstead v. United
States, 276 U.S. 609, 609 (1928) (mem.); Pueblo of Santa Rosa v. Fall, 273 U.S. 678, 678
(1926) (mem.).
346. See infra text accompanying notes 362–375.
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Olmstead: Internal Disagreements About Limiting Review on Certiorari

Olmstead is a foundational case in criminal procedure. It is also the
ﬁrst case in which the Court unambiguously asserted the power to use certiorari to take particular questions instead of reviewing the case as a
whole.347 As such, it deserves a place in the federal courts canon.
In brief, the facts of the case involve a somewhat large conspiracy to
traffic in illicit alcohol in the state of Washington during the Prohibition
Era.348 Without a warrant, federal officials tapped the phones of several key
players in the scheme in violation of a state statute prohibiting such taps.349
The transcripts of many of these recordings were read to the jury during
the trial, and the defense objected repeatedly, thus preserving the evidentiary ruling for an eventual appeal on error.350 The conspirators were convicted and lost their subsequent appeal at the Ninth Circuit.351
Several defendants then applied to the Supreme Court for certiorari.
The defendants all claimed that the wiretaps violated their constitutional
rights and that the district court erred by admitting the transcripts into
evidence.352 At least one of the defendants also alleged that the district
court erred in admitting the transcripts because such taps were illegal in
Washington, and it is improper to admit illegally obtained evidence.353
Consistent with the Court’s rules, the petitioners’ briefs followed the
form for writs of error. In particular, the briefs set out their complaints
about the lower courts’ legal decisions in an “Assignment of Errors.”354
The parties had every reason to expect that, if certiorari were issued, the
Court would proceed as if on a writ of error and examine the entire record,
especially all of these alleged errors.
As it turns out, the Court did grant certiorari on January 9, 1928. But
the order limited consideration “to the single question [of] whether the
use of evidence of private telephone conversations between the defend-

347. See Olmstead, 276 U.S. at 609.
348. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 455–57 (1928).
349. See id.
350. Id. at 471 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
351. Id. at 438.
352. Id. at 455.
353. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11, Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438 (No. 533) (arguing
that “[b]ecause the tapping of the telephone wires was unlawful, being a direct violation of
the penal statutes of the State of Washington, . . . the evidence[,] . . . having been obtained
unlawfully, was inadmissible”).
354. Sup. Ct. R. 25 (1926). The Court’s rules from this period are a bit convoluted on
the subject. Rule 8 separately required an assignment of errors for appeals or writs of error.
Sup. Ct. R. 8 (1926). For certiorari, Rule 35 only required the transcript, “a summary and
short statement of the matter involved and the reasons relied on for the allowance of the
writ.” Sup. Ct. R. 35 (1926). The rule also permitted a supporting brief that must follow
Rule 25, which required an assignment of errors. Sup. Ct. R. 25 (1926).
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ants and others, intercepted by means of wire tapping, amounted to a violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments . . . .”355 What exactly this
limitation meant became a matter of some dispute among the Justices.
Writing for a ﬁve-member majority, Chief Justice Taft declared that
wiretaps were not searches or seizures under the Constitution.356 The four
dissenters each wrote separately. Each dissenter had a different view on
how the Court should have reached a different decision.
Three dissenters were convinced that the evidentiary question fell
within the Court’s jurisdiction despite the limitation in the order granting
certiorari. Justice Louis Brandeis wrote a thorough and colorful dissent
arguing that the transcripts should not have been allowed into evidence.357
He argued that the petitioners were correct that warrantless wiretaps violated their constitutional rights and that it was improper to admit illegally
obtained evidence.358 Justice Holmes similarly thought that the government should not be able to use illegally obtained evidence,359 but unlike
Brandeis, Holmes was unwilling to support the petitioners’ constitutional
claims.360 He did not dismiss the argument outright, but he would have
avoided the question, apparently since he thought it properly decided in
favor of the petitioners on the evidentiary claim.361
Justices Harlan Fiske Stone and Pierce Butler most squarely took up
the jurisdictional questions. Stone agreed with Brandeis that the petitioners should win on both questions but wrote separately to question the majority’s assumption that the limited grant of certiorari constrained the
Court’s jurisdiction in the case.362 Stone believed that the effect of limiting
certiorari to the constitutional question was “to limit the argument to a
single question.”363 He did not view the grant of certiorari as “restrain[ing]
the [C]ourt from . . . consider[ing]. . . any question . . . presented by the
record.”364 He reasoned that under section 240(a) of the Judicial Code,
the Court “determine[d] a case . . . on certiorari ‘with the same power and
authority, and with like effect, as if the cause had been brought . . . by unrestricted writ of error or appeal.’”365 If operating according to a writ of

355. Olmstead, 276 U.S. at 609. Interestingly, the Court initially denied certiorari, but it
changed its mind upon a petition for rehearing. Id.
356. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 438, 455, 466.
357. Id. at 471–85 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
358. Id. at 479–80.
359. Id. at 469–71 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
360. Id. at 469 (“While I do not deny it I am not prepared to say that the penumbra of
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments covers the defendant . . . .”).
361. See id. at 469–70.
362. Id. at 488 (Stone, J., dissenting).
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 347(a) (1926)).
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error, all potential errors observable in the record are on the table.366
In contrast, Justice Butler ignored the evidentiary claim entirely. He
was of the view that, since “[t]he order allowing the writs of certiorari operated to limit arguments of counsel to the constitutional question . . .
[he] prefer[red] to say nothing concerning those questions because they
are not within the jurisdiction taken by the order.”367 Still, he would have
decided in favor of the petitioners on the constitutional question and reversed the convictions.368
The scattering of opinions in Olmstead demonstrates a range of different understandings as to the Court’s power to constrain appellate review
through certiorari. Brandeis and Holmes wrote as if the order limiting certiorari to the constitutional questions were irrelevant.369 They openly considered alternative grounds of relief with the same care and concern as
they did the constitutional questions.370 They took the arguments
grounded in the effect of the state statute just as seriously as they did the
constitutional claims.371
Justice Stone agreed with Brandeis and Holmes that the Court could
and should consider claims that fell outside of the announced scope of
certiorari.372 But he believed it was appropriate for the Court to direct lawyers to narrow the scope of their arguments.373 In some ways, this directive
could be seen as loosely binding, friendly advice to counsel. Lawyers would
be well advised to talk about the questions of primary interest to the Justices, but the Court would still consider the full panoply of questions involved in the case.
In contrast, Justice Butler believed that when the Court limited certiorari to the constitutional question, it also limited the Court’s jurisdiction.374 Under Butler’s view, the Court could bind itself—at least
temporarily—so that it only had power to review particular and identiﬁed
questions. This jurisdictional limitation would have signiﬁcant impact, as
the Court had longstanding and strongly held views about acting beyond
the scope of its subject matter jurisdiction.375
366. See id.; supra section II.D.1.
367. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 486 (Butler, J., dissenting).
368. Id. at 488.
369. See id. at 479–85 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); id. at 469–70 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
370. Id. at 479–85 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); id. at 469–70 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
371. Id. at 479–85 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); id. at 469–70 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
372. Id. at 488 (Stone, J., dissenting).
373. Id.
374. Id. at 486 (Butler, J., dissenting). Justice Butler did not offer an argument or citation in support of this proposition. Id.
375. See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) (remarking that
usurping jurisdiction where none is given “would be treason to the constitution”); Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 138 (1803) (holding that the Supreme Court had no
power to issue a writ of mandamus since doing so was beyond its subject matter jurisdiction).
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The majority of the Court occupied something of a middle ground
on this jurisdictional question. It was plainly annoyed at the dissenters for
raising the matter of illegally obtained evidence.376 After explaining the
majority’s decision on the constitutional question, Taft averred that said
explanation “disposes of the only question that comes within the terms of
our order granting certiorari.”377 However, since some Justices, “departing
from that order, . . . concluded that there [was] merit” in arguments about
admitting illegally obtained evidence, the majority went on to deal with
those questions.378
The majority position differed from Butler’s in that Taft’s majority
clearly assumed its jurisdiction to answer questions outside the limits set
by the certiorari grant. But the majority also seemed to feel that dealing
with questions outside of the grant was merely permissible, not obligatory,
given that it said it chose to discuss the question only because dissenting
Justices dealt with it.379 In this way, the Court differed from Stone,
Brandeis, and Holmes, all of whom thought the Court must deal with all
plausible errors in the record. The majority would probably have been perfectly happy to answer only the constitutional question, affirm, and leave
the other questions unexamined. They seemed to think that the Court did
not need to decide everything within its jurisdiction.380
The understanding of the majority—which included Taft, McReynolds, and Van Devanter—directly contradicted the testimony these same
Justices had given to Congress about the Judges’ Bill,381 as well as the
Court’s established certiorari practice.382 Recall that these Justices told
Congress that review on certiorari extended to “the whole case and every
question presented in it.”383 The Justices never suggested the capaciousness of such review would be at the pleasure of the Justices. Moreover, the

376. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466 (“[S]ome of our number, departing from [the Court’s
order granting certiorari], have concluded that there is merit in the twofold objection, overruled in both courts below, that evidence obtained through intercepting of telephone messages by . . . government agents was inadmissible . . . .”).
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. Taft was a great admirer of Chief Justice Marshall. See Robert C. Post, Chief Justice
William Howard Taft and the Concept of Federalism, 9 Const. Comment. 199, 202 (1992).
But here, he seems to part with Marshall’s reasoning in Cohens. See Cohens, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) at 404 (“Questions may occur which we would gladly avoid; but we cannot avoid
them. All we can do is, to exercise our best judgment, and conscientiously to perform our
duty.”).
381. See supra notes 341–343 and accompanying text.
382. See, e.g., Am. Constr. Co. v. Jacksonville, Tampa & Key W. Ry. Co., 148 U.S. 372,
382 (1893) (noting that, by certiorari, the Court “orders the whole case to be sent up for its
review and determination”).
383. 66 Cong. Rec. 2921 (1925) (reproducing Letter from William H. Taft, C.J., U.S.
Sup. Ct., to Royal S. Copeland, Sen., U.S. Senate (Dec. 31, 1924)).
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majority rejected the Court’s traditional understanding that “it is the duty
of the court to give judgment on the whole record.”384 Taft and the
Olmstead majority denied any such duty.385
C.

Maryland Casualty: From Internal Disagreement to Irony

If Olmstead showed that the Court was divided over its power to limit
the scope of review through certiorari, Maryland Casualty Co. v. Jones386 suggests that such disagreements lasted only about a year. The Court released
its decision in Olmstead on June 4, 1928.387 Less than a year later, on December 10, 1928, the Court granted certiorari in Maryland Casualty, but
the Justices limited certiorari “to the question [of] whether the Circuit
Court of Appeals erred in failing to review the rulings of the District Court
in the progress of the trial, excepted to at the time and duly presented by
a bill of exceptions.”388 The Justices unanimously reversed the lower court
and remanded the case.389
Note the irony of the Court’s decision. The Court—proceeding “with
the same power and authority, and with like effect, as if the cause had been
brought there by unrestricted writ of error or appeal”390—reviewed the
Ninth Circuit, which was also proceeding on a writ of error.391 The Court
limited review to the question of whether the Ninth Circuit erred in limiting its own review to a particular question.392 It then decided that, “[s]ince
on the face of the record the failure of the Circuit Court of Appeals to
consider the assignments of error relating to rulings at the hearing is unexplained, and its action appears to have been erroneous, its judgment
must be reversed.”393 In effect, the Court slapped down the Ninth Circuit
for doing exactly what the Supreme Court was doing: cherry-picking
questions when proceeding according to a writ of error. No Justice wrote

384. Garland v. Davis, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 131, 143 (1846).
385. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 438 (1928) (noting that the petitions for
certiorari in the consolidated cases were “granted with the distinct limitation that the hearing should be conﬁned to the single question”).
386. Md. Cas. Co. v. Jones, 278 U.S. 596 (1928) (mem.).
387. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 438.
388. Md. Cas. Co., 278 U.S. at 596. The petitioner also claimed that the circuit court
erred in ﬁnding and holding that “[a]ll the assignments of error [were] based upon the
insufficiency of the testimony to support the special ﬁndings . . . .” Brief on Behalf of
Maryland Casualty Co., Petitioner at 6–7, Md. Cas. Co. v. Jones, 279 U.S. 792 (1929) (No.
524) (quoting Md. Cas. Co. v. Jones, 27 F.2d 521, 522 (9th Cir. 1928)).
389. Md. Cas. Co., 279 U.S. at 795–97.
390. Judiciary Act of 1925, Pub. L. No. 68-415, sec. 1, § 240(a), 43 Stat. 936, 939.
391. Md. Cas. Co., 27 F.2d at 522.
392. Md. Cas. Co., 279 U.S. at 794.
393. Id. at 796.
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separately to renew the argument about the effect of limiting the certiorari
grant.394
Yet, while the Court felt free to narrow review through orders that
limited certiorari, it did not treat such orders as limiting its own jurisdiction. If the Justices wanted to look beyond the questions presented, they
felt free to do so. The Court made this clear in Langnes v. Green, stating
that it could look to any objection raised at trial, even if not set out in a
petition for certiorari.395 That opinion revisited Holmes’s majority opinion
in Hubbard, which limited review to issues included in the assignments of
error. The Langnes Court said Hubbard offered a “rule of practice” but not
a limitation on the Court’s power to decide any question based on the record before it.396 In reaffirming its ability to reach the full record, the
Langnes majority added a useful qualiﬁer: The Court could go beyond the
assignment of error “if [it] deems there is good reason to do so.”397 Thus,
the Court could now narrow or expand the scope of its review to the questions it desired. Taft brought the Court a long way from any “duty to give
judgment on the whole record.”398
D. The Legacy of Chief Justice Taft
This radical departure is all the more surprising given the Taft Court’s
commitment to “normalcy”399 in its substantive jurisprudence. Nonetheless, Taft’s procedural reforms radically reshaped the Court’s internal behaviors and external role in public life. These changes were only partly
intentional. Clearly, Taft intended to transform the Court through the
Judges’ Bill from the court of last resort to protect all federal rights to an
expositor of “important principles of law” that would “help the people at
large to a knowledge of their rights and duties, and to make the law
clearer.”400
This implied a shift of audiences. The Court shifted its primary focus
from persuading the litigants of the legitimacy of the Court’s decision to
394. Id. at 797. Yet in two other cases, Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone—three of the
Olmstead dissenters—joined the majority when the Court limited review to a subset of questions presented. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Raladam, 283 U.S. 643, 644–54 (1931); Aldridge
v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 309–18 (1931).
395. 282 U.S. 531, 538 (1931).
396. Id. The Court had been rather ﬁrm about this rule of practice in the past. See
Webster Elec. Co. v. Splitdorf Elec. Co., 264 U.S. 463, 464 (1924); see also Reynolds
Robertson, Appellate Practice and Procedure in the Supreme Court of the United States 26
(1928).
397. Langnes, 282 U.S. at 538.
398. Garland v. Davis, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 131, 143 (1846).
399. See Robert C. Post, Defending the Lifeworld: Substantive Due Process in the Taft
Court Era, 78 B.U. L. Rev. 1489, 1494–505 (1998).
400. Post, Supreme Court Opinion as Institutional Practice, supra note 323, at 1273
(quoting William Howard Taft, Address to the New York County Lawyers’ Association 6–7
(Feb. 18, 1922) (Taft Papers, Reel 590)).
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persuading the nation. Taft thought the Court could do this while still
“enunciating the same kind of stable and deﬁnite legal principles”401 it
had when operating as a court of last resort speaking to individual litigants.
The Judges’ Bill was supposed to make the Court more efficient, not
change the nature of its work.402
The Judges’ Bill put the Court’s destiny on a knife’s edge. Given
power to choose its cases and opportunity to address a larger public, the
Court could have gone one of two ways. It might have tried to decide a
smaller set of more important cases and worked hard to explain the
outcome of those cases to the larger public.403 On this model, the Court
would still conceive of itself as merely ﬁnding the law, treating opinions as
vehicles to make that law clearer to the masses. The other possibility was
for the Court to function “as a lawgiver, as an originator of law.”404
Taft was naturally inclined to the former view, but the turn to a more
public audience and the selection of cases based on their importance to
the public put a great deal of strain on that model.405 The pressures of
operating almost exclusively in a more politically salient set of cases and
self-consciously speaking to a vastly larger audience naturally pushed the
Court into broader and more politicized conversations than it had previously entered.406
These pressures pushed Taft’s preferred model to the breaking point,
and Olmstead and the continuing shift to taking questions snapped it. Before Olmstead, the Court had to repeatedly return to the mundane and
ordinary parts of even the most atypical and signiﬁcant litigation to decide
a case. It had to use a familiar and distinctly legal set of tools to reach a
decision about who should win or lose a case based on the totality of the
record. After Olmstead, the “interesting” questions could be plucked from
the record and considered in the abstract. As the Court gradually abandoned the case adjudication model in certiorari, it pushed on. In the following years, the Court expanded its agenda-control powers in numerous
ways. For instance, in 1939, it amended its relevant rule governing certiorari petitions to limit review to the questions presented in the petition,407
401. Id. at 1306.
402. Id. at 1308.
403. One leading scholar has forcefully argued that this is exactly what the Court should
do and what Congress intended. See Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Case for Vertical
Maximalism, 95 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 2–5, 40–59 (2009); Tara Leigh Grove, Tiers of Scrutiny in
a Hierarchical Judiciary, 14 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 475, 475–87 (2016).
404. Post, Supreme Court Opinion as Institutional Practice, supra note 323, at 1308.
405. Robert Post is of the view that this shift in audience was a sufficient condition to
move the Court into the jurisgenerative mode. Id.
406. See id. (tracking the shift in the Court’s opinions and noting they become longer
and begin to engage more with legal scholarship).
407. See Sup. Ct. R. 38.2, 479 F.3d 1 (1939) (repealed 1954) (“Only the questions speciﬁcally brought forward by the petition for writ of certiorari will be considered.”). This
language was not included in rules promulgated in 1931, 1932, 1934, or 1936. See Sup. Ct.
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effectively codifying the rule traced back to Alice State Bank. It began to
treat its mandatory docket as if it were discretionary,408 effectively ended
question certiﬁcation as a meaningful pathway to review,409 and gave itself
R. 38, 275 U.S. 595 (1928) (repealed 1934); Sup. Ct. R. 38, 292 U.S. 671 (1934) (repealed
1936). By the time the Court formally changed its rule in 1939, the legal community had
already noted the change in practice over the previous decade—and if the term analysis of
the business of the Court by Frankfurter and Landis is any indicator—widely accepted this
change and attributed it, yet again, to an overburdened Court. In their analysis of the
Court’s 1927 term, Felix Frankfurter and James Landis noted the “enlargement of the area
of discretionary jurisdiction opened the door to new difficulties” and the steady increase of
petitions for certiorari planted “the seeds of competition between the task of deciding cases
and the necessity of disposing of petitions.” Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The
Supreme Court Under the Judiciary Act of 1925, 42 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 11–21 (1928). After the
Court began restricting the scope of review in the following year, Frankfurter and Landis
acknowledged the “stringent policy” of sound judicial discretion laid out by the Court in
Rule 38.5 regarding the granting of certiorari but argued “the circumstances under which
it is employed—the pressure of the Court’s business—make extremely difficult the application of the Court’s avowed criteria.” Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Business of
the Supreme Court at October Term, 1928, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 33, 50 (1029). They urged the
Court to ﬁnd a suitable remedy to avoid grievances that might result from “an unequal administration of discretionary jurisdiction” to prevent “crude attempts at legislative correction.” Id. By 1934, Felix Frankfurter and Henry Hart argued certiorari “made possible the
Court’s extraordinary achievement of . . . keeping abreast of its docket” but warned such an
accomplishment would certainly “be impaired by continuing increase in the number of petitions ﬁled.” Felix Frankfurter & Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Business of the Supreme Court at
October Term, 1933, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 238, 263 (1934). They commended the “great wisdom
of Congress in its more recent legislation governing the Supreme Court” in avoiding “detailed and explicit” acts which might “sterilize the Court’s own resourcefulness in suiting its
ways of doing business” and relying “more and more on the Supreme Court’s wisdom in the
conduct of the Court’s business.” Id. at 277. Seemingly interpreting the increase in discretionary jurisdiction granted in the Judges’ Bill as an increase in discretion across the board,
Frankfurter and Hart acknowledged the Court’s actions, attributed them to workload management, and believed they were in the best interests of the Court and the pursuit of justice
as early as 1934. See id. at 277–78.
408. See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, The Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: Reﬂections on the Law and the Logistics of Direct Review, 34 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1043, 1061
(1977) (asserting that the Supreme Court has disregarded its “statutory duty to decide appealed cases on the merits” and more freely dismisses cases).
409. See Hartnett, supra note 2, at 1710–12 (“[J]ust as the Court increased its power to
set its own agenda by tending to treat appeals more like petitions for certiorari, so too it
largely deprived the lower courts of their promised role [through certiﬁcation] in controlling the Supreme Court’s docket.”); Aaron Nielson, The Death of the Supreme Court’s
Certiﬁed Question Jurisdiction, 59 Cath. U. L. Rev. 483, 486–87 (2010) (noting that “there
is little hope of resurrection” of certiﬁcation as a meaningful route to Supreme Court
review); Amanda L. Tyler, Setting the Supreme Court’s Agenda: Is There a Place for
Certiﬁcation?, 78 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1310, 1320–21 (2010) (noting the Supreme Court’s
resistance to accepting cases through certiﬁcation); see also Eugene Gressman, Kenneth S.
Geller, Stephen M. Shapiro, Timothy S. Bishop & Edward A. Hartnett, Supreme Court
Practice 597 (9th ed. 2007). As Gressman et al. explain:
The disfavor with which the Court regards certiﬁcates may result from its
fear that unrestricted use of the certiﬁcation process would frustrate the
Court’s discretionary power to limit its review to cases it deems worthy.
For if the courts of appeals were free to request instructions from the
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more ﬂexibility over cases emerging from the states.410
E.

Statutory Developments After the Judges’ Bill: Changes to the Language

There is an obvious, and potentially important, difference between
the language in the Judges’ Bill and the language in today’s operative statute. The former explicitly linked certiorari review to the writ of error and
appeal, while the modern statute does not. The previous sections demonstrate that certiorari, when used as a device to take jurisdiction on appeal,
was, prior to Olmstead, always understood to lead to a comprehensive and
limited review of the case as if on a writ of error or appeal.411 That history
is informative, but if Congress removed that language in order to free the
Court to target questions instead of cases, the history would likely be irrelevant. How then did this language leave the statute?
Two statutes help to answer this question. First, in 1928, Congress
passed a statute abolishing the writ of error but requiring that “[a]ll relief
which heretofore could be obtained by writ of error shall hereafter be obtainable by appeal.”412 Within a matter of weeks, Congress reversed course
and passed a new statute amending the former. The law henceforth was
that “[t]he statutes regulating the right to a writ of error, deﬁning the relief which may be had thereon, and prescribing the mode of exercising
that right and of invoking such relief . . . shall be applicable to the appeal
which the preceding section substitutes for a writ of error.”413 The general
consensus is that Congress only managed to swap out the name “appeal”
for “writ of error.”414 Indeed, the statutes still make the distinction between
Supreme Court on any doubtful question, the effect might be to vest in
them a substantial part of the discretion to determine what cases the
Supreme Court should hear. Whatever the reason, the Court has made
the statutory provision authorizing the certiﬁcate procedure virtually, but
not quite, a dead letter.
Id.
410. See, e.g., Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 477 (1975) (“There are now at
least four categories of such cases in which the Court has . . . taken jurisdiction without
awaiting the completion of the additional proceedings anticipated in the lower state
courts.”); N.D. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder’s Drug Stores, Inc., 414 U.S. 156, 159–64
(1973) (reviewing and overruling a North Dakota Supreme Court decision by treating the
state court’s decision as “ﬁnal” such that the ﬁnality requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1257 did
not restrict the Court’s ability to review the state court decision).
411. See supra sections II.C–IV.A.
412. An Act in Reference to Writs of Error, Pub. L. No. 70-12, § 1, 45 Stat. 54, 54 (1928),
amended by an Act to Amend Section 2 of An Act entitled “An Act in Reference to Writs of
Error”, Pub. L. No. 70-322, 45 Stat. 466, 466 (1928).
413. An Act to Amend Section 2 of an Act entitled “An Act in Reference to Writs of
Error”, Pub. L. No. 70-322, § 2, 45 Stat. 466, 466 (1928).
414. See Philip M. Payne, The Abolition of Writs of Error in the Federal Courts, 15 Va.
L. Rev. 305, 318 (1929) (“A mere change of terminology appears to be the only result of the
seven years of effort by Congress to adopt the proposed simpliﬁed procedure for the Federal
courts. A writ of error is now called an appeal, but otherwise the practice and procedure
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judgments and decrees today.415
Second, in 1948, Congress codiﬁed the judicial code in Title 28, leaving the core of the Court’s obligations unchanged. The text neither
changed the Court’s obligations nor mentioned its new practice of focusing on questions through certiorari.416 The revision dropped the traditional language about “like effect as if the case had been brought there
with unrestricted appeal,”417 but the surviving language maintained the
traditional links from certiorari to cases and from certiﬁcation to questions. It is therefore difficult to interpret the revised language as a ratiﬁcation of the Court’s willingness to look at questions instead of cases.418
Any implicit congressional ratiﬁcation, then, must proceed as an argument from silence. As the Court itself has said, “It is at best treacherous
to ﬁnd in congressional silence alone the adoption of a controlling rule of
law.”419 Such arguments require a showing that Congress “considered [the
interpretation] in great detail.”420 Moreover, the bar is especially high
when trying to use such arguments to amend the Court’s jurisdiction.421
When Congress fails to consider a substantial change in traditional jurisdictional rules, that fact alone “readily disposes of any argument that Congress unmistakably intended to” change those rules.422

remain unchanged.”). Left unmentioned in the new statute is whether the Court should
treat the “appeal,” once it has gone through the writ of error procedure, as a writ of error
(limiting review to the law) or as an appeal, which would give the Court power to review the
facts. The Court soon took to reviewing facts in important cases. See Vicki C. Jackson,
Thayer, Holmes, Brandeis: Conceptions of Judicial Review, Factﬁnding, and Proportionality, 130 Harv. L. Rev. 2348, 2388–89 (2017) (discussing examples of cases in which the Court
reviewed lower court fact-ﬁnding, including Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 589–90 (1935),
and Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 165 (2007)). Such a review would have been impossible on a traditional writ of error.
415. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1258 (2018) (“Final judgments or decrees rendered by the
Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico may be reviewed by the Supreme
Court by writ of certiorari . . . .”). Judgments resolve an action at law; decrees are the analogue in equity. See Decree, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
416. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1260.
417. Judiciary Act of 1925, Pub. L. No. 68-415, sec. 1, § 240(a), 43 Stat. 936, 939; see also
Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-773, § 1257, 62 Stat. 869, 929 (codiﬁed at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1257 (1948)).
418. To do so would be akin to looking for elephants in mouseholes. See, e.g., Whitman
v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001).
419. Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69–70 (1946).
420. Nat’l Lab. Rels. Bd. v. Gullett Gin Co., 340 U.S. 361, 366 (1951).
421. See Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 462 (1990) (stating that “the question is not
whether any intent at all may be divined from legislative silence on the issue, but whether
Congress in its deliberations may be said to have affirmatively or unmistakably intended” to
amend jurisdictional practices).
422. Id.
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Far from endorsing, Congress was quite likely unaware that the Court
was shifting its practice. The Court did not change its rules to limit consideration to the questions presented until 1939,423 when the world was descending into war. From Olmstead through 1938, the Court only limited its
certiorari grant in sixty cases, which amounts to less than ﬁve percent of
its orders granting certiorari.424
Nor does the legislative history suggest Congress intended to ratify the
Court’s new, but still rare, practice.425 To the contrary, it plainly suggests
Congress wanted to leave the existing statutory law unchanged. The House
Judiciary Committee’s report said that the effect of codiﬁcation would be
“to preserve existing law” regarding the Court’s certiorari powers so that
it would “retain the power of unrestricted review of cases certiﬁed or
brought up on certiorari.”426 The report asserted that the changes are
merely “in phraseology and arrangement.”427 For its part, the Senate Judiciary Committee report asserts that “great care [was] exercised to make no
changes in the existing law which would not meet with substantially unanimous approval.”428
F.

Statutory Developments After the Judges’ Bill: Reducing the Workload

For the next forty years, Congress continued to transfer cases from
the Court’s mandatory “appeal” jurisdiction to its discretionary certiorari
jurisdiction.429 This process culminated in the Supreme Court Case
Selections Act of 1988, which ended all mandatory jurisdiction save cases
coming from three-judge panels.430
Once again, the Justices lobbied hard for this statutory change, and
once again, their argument before Congress seemed to differ somewhat
from the Court’s subsequent practices. The Justices’ argument was built
on the familiar claim that the Court was overburdened with cases and

423. Sup. Ct. R. 41 (1939).
424. List of limitations collected by and available from the author.
425. The 1940s saw a marked increase in the importance of legislative history, reﬂecting
the New Deal lawyers’ growing abilities to generate and use such history in litigation. See
Nicholas R. Parrillo, Leviathan and Interpretive Revolution: The Administrative State, the
Judiciary, and the Rise of Legislative History, 1890–1950, 123 Yale L.J. 266, 283 (2013).
426. H.R. Rep. No. 80-308, at A107 (1947).
427. Id. Similarly, in codifying section 1257 regarding certiorari to state courts, the report notes that the language requiring certiorari to lead to review “‘with the same power
and authority and with like effect as if brought up by appeal’ was omitted as unnecessary.”
Id. at A108.
428. S. Rep. No. 80-1559, at 2 (1948).
429. See generally Mark Tushnet, The Mandatory Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court—
Some Recent Developments, 46 U. Cin. L. Rev. 347 (1977) (noting that historically, in line
with the “natural bias” of the Court, Congress has acted to reduce the Court’s mandatory
jurisdiction).
430. See Act of June 27, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662, 662.
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needed relief.431 The culprit was the set of mandatory appeals that “require[d] cases to be decided by the Supreme Court . . . without regard to
the importance of the issue.”432 The alleged result was that the Court “must
often call for full brieﬁng and oral argument” in these cases.433 These irrelevant appeals were crowding out time that could be better spent on “the
more important cases facing the nation” (notice, the Court still used
“cases” instead of “questions” when addressing Congress) that came
through the certiorari docket.434
This argument implied that the Court would start taking more cases
through certiorari if Congress eliminated most of its mandatory jurisdiction. Some important cases previously taken as appeals would shift over to
certiorari. Also, relieved of unimportant mandatory appeals, the Court
would have more time to spend on additional certiorari cases. Had these
claims been true, the result should have been that the Court granted certiorari more often after the passage of the 1988 Act than before. This did
not happen.
After the 1988 reforms, the Court cut its workload by a third.435 Not
only did the Justices take fewer cases in total but they granted fewer petitions for certiorari. The Court granted certiorari in 1,287 cases in the ten
terms leading up to the 1988 Act and only 1,012 in the following ten
terms.436 Once again, what the Supreme Court told Congress it would do
with increased discretion and what it actually did with that new power differed notably.

431. H.R. Rep. No. 100-660, at 2 (1988).
432. Id. app. at 27 (quoting Letter from William Rehnquist, C.J., U.S. Sup. Ct., to Robert
Kastenmeier, Chair, H. Subcomm. on Antitrust, Com. & Admin. L. (June 17, 1982)).
433. Id.
434. Id.; see also S. Rep. 100-300, at 2 (1988) (“[A]ppeals not only take up a disproportionate amount of the Court’s resources but may do so at the expense of petitions for certiorari which might otherwise have been granted.” (quoting Letter from William Rehnquist,
C.J., U.S. Sup. Ct., to Robert Kastenmeier, Chair, H. Subcomm. on Antitrust, Com. & Admin.
L. (Dec. 2, 1987))).
435. In the ten terms from 1979–1988, the Court decided, on average, 162 cases per
year. In the ten subsequent terms (1989–1998), the average fell to under 108 cases per term.
See The Supreme Court Database, Wash. U. Sch. of L., http://www.scdb.wustl.edu/
[https://perma.cc/KDA9-SYBC] (last visited Nov. 2, 2021). To recover the numbers, use
the SCDB_2021_01 release of the case-centered citation database. First, count the number
of unique cases—identiﬁed by the caseId variable—included in the database for the 1979–
1988 and 1989–1998 terms (1622 and 1078, respectively). Then divide by ten.
436. Counts compiled by the author based on data from Wash. U. Sch. of L., supra note
435. To recover the numbers, use the SCDB_2021_01 release of the case-centered citation
database. The counts are the number of unique cases—identiﬁed by the caseId variable—
where the Court took jurisdiction through certiorari (jurisdiction=1) for the 1979–1988 and
1989–1998 terms.
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This trend is visible in the following chart. The dotted line counts the
number of unique opinions issued following oral argument in each term,
leaving out cases taken through certiorari or the Court’s original docket.
The solid line represents the number of opinions issued after oral argument in cases taken through certiorari. The vertical dashed lines denote
the passage of the Evarts Act, the Judges’ Bill, and the Supreme Court Case
Selections Act, respectively.

This picture makes a few things clear. First, the drop after the rightmost vertical line shows that the Court took fewer certiorari cases after
Congress removed mandatory jurisdiction in 1988, contradicting Chief
Justice William Rehnquist’s assertions. Second, despite the Court’s protestations of being overburdened, the Court was deciding roughly 150 cases
each term in 1988. This is a far cry from the 200 or more cases the Court
decided in the years leading up to the Judges’ Bill when Justices did not
have clerks, computers, or electronic legal databases. Today, the Court decides roughly seventy cases a year.
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V. IS FUNCTIONALISM THE ANSWER?
In the wake of the 1988 Act, the Court has nearly complete control of
its agenda to take the cases—and questions—it wants.437 This state of affairs seems to rest uneasily with the text and history of the relevant statutes.
This descriptive observation raises some normative concerns. If the Court
did not pursue question selection at the direction of Congress or pursuant
to the traditional appellate power, on what grounds could the Court defend the practice? The most obvious theory would be a functionalist account that would stress the beneﬁts of agenda control as a justiﬁcation for
overriding the text. This Part considers two questions related to such a
functionalist defense. First, how has the Court treated parallel arguments
from administrative bodies and lower courts? Second, are there costs from
question selection that must be accounted for in any functionalist defense?
A.

Agenda-Setting in the Administrative State: Do as We Say, Not as We Do?

The Court is not the only entity tasked by Congress with reviewing
decisions. In recent cases, the Court has encountered administrative agencies and lower courts that have taken it upon themselves to narrow the
scope of review. In each instance, the limitation of review was defended—
at least in part—on functionalist grounds. In each instance, the Court rejected the functionalist arguments in favor of the plain text.
Consider SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu, which involved the scope of inter
partes review: an adversarial process before the Patent Office.438 To begin
this process, one party challenges a previously issued patent by ﬁling a petition to institute review. The petition must identify, “with particularity,
each claim challenged, the grounds on which the challenge to each claim
is based, and the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to
each claim.”439 The statute then allows for a response.440 If the Director
determines “that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would
prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition,”441
then the Director “determine[s] whether to institute an inter partes review.”442 If the Director determines an inter partes review is appropriate,
the review culminates in “a ﬁnal written decision with respect to the patentability of any patent claim challenged by the petitioner.”443

437.
438.
439.
440.
441.
442.
443.

See Hartnett, supra note 2, at 1707.
138 S. Ct. 1348, 1352–53 (2018).
35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (2018).
Id. § 313.
Id. § 314(a).
Id. § 314(b).
Id. § 318(a).
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The Court took up the question of whether the Patent Office must
“resolve all of the claims in the case, or . . . only some of them.”444 The
Court held that the Patent Office had to answer all of the questions.445 The
majority opinion is worthy of examination in light of the preceding
examination of the Court’s own appellate history and practice.
In Iancu, the majority began by noting that the expansive language in
§ 318 requires a determination on “any patent claim challenged by the
petitioner.”446 The Court contrasted this expansive language with an
alternative review mechanism in § 303 that gives the Director the power to
investigate individual questions.447 “If Congress had wanted to give the
Director” power to choose what questions to answer under inter partes
review, “it knew exactly how to do so—it could have simply borrowed from
the statute next door.”448
It is hard to read this language and not think of the similarly contrasting language in the statute governing the Court’s certiorari jurisdiction.449 That statute links certiorari to cases and certiﬁcation to
questions.450 If Congress had wanted to give the Court certiorari jurisdiction over questions, it knew exactly how to do so—it could have simply
borrowed from the same section.
The Court’s Iancu decision then noted that, under § 314, the Director
gets to decide “whether to institute an inter partes review.”451 “That
language indicates a binary choice—either institute review or don’t.”452
The majority reasoned that, though the statute “invests the Director with
discretion on the question whether to institute review, it doesn’t follow that
the statute affords him discretion regarding what claims that review will
encompass.”453
The Court was unimpressed by the Director’s argument that allowing
him to select the important questions “is efficient because it permits the
Board to focus on the most promising challenges and avoid spending time
and resources on others.”454 Such “[p]olicy arguments,” the Court said,

444. SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1353 (2018).
445. Id. (“The [Patent Office] cannot curate the claims at issue but must decide them
all.”).
446. Id. at 1353 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 318(a)).
447. Id. at 1355.
448. Id.
449. See 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (2018).
450. Id.
451. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. at 1355 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 35 U.S.C.
§ 314(b)).
452. Id.
453. Id. at 1356.
454. Id. at 1357.
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“are properly addressed to Congress.”455 Further, “[t]he Director may (today) think his approach makes for better policy, but policy considerations
cannot create an ambiguity when the words on the page are clear.”456 In
the end, the Court decided that “[n]othing suggests the Director enjoys a
license to depart from the petition and institute a different . . . review of his
own design.”457
And yet the Court seems to be in an analogous situation to the Director. Section 1254 arguably invests the Court “with discretion on the question whether to institute review, [but] it doesn’t follow that the statute
affords” the Justices “discretion regarding what claims that review will encompass.”458 Perhaps there are policy arguments in favor of allowing the
Court to select the important questions “because it permits” the Court “to
focus on the most promising challenges and avoid spending time and resources on others.”459 But aren’t these policy questions best addressed to
Congress?460 The Court may think its current approach “makes for better
policy, but policy considerations cannot create an ambiguity when the
words on the page are clear.”461
B.

Agenda-Setting in the Lower Courts

Iancu dealt with the administrative state, but the Court has had little
time for functionalist arguments from circuit courts either.462 In BP P.L.C.
v. Mayor of Baltimore, the Court considered the scope of appellate review
over an order remanding a case to state court.463 Baltimore sued various
energy companies in state court, and the defendants removed the case to
455. Id. at 1358.
456. Id.
457. Id. at 1356.
458. Id.; accord 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (2018) (“Cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court . . . [b]y writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of any
party to any civil or criminal case.”).
459. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. at 1357.
460. Id. at 1358. Despite making policy arguments on other grounds, the Court distinctly omitted policy arguments regarding the extent of its review in 1988. See supra note
434 and accompanying text (noting that the Court still used “cases” instead of “questions”
when addressing Congress).
461. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. at 1358.
462. C.f. United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. 1575, 1579–82 (2020) (“[A] court
is not hidebound by the precise arguments of counsel, but the Ninth Circuit’s radical transformation of this case goes well beyond the pale.”). The Ninth Circuit had sua sponte invited
amici to brief questions that were not part of the appeal. Id. at 1580–81. The Supreme Court
reversed, asserting that this violated the principle of party presentation. Id. at 1578. For a
discussion of Sineneng-Smith, see generally Thomas P. Schmidt, Judicial Minimalism in the
Lower Courts, 108 Va. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2022), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3914201
[https://perma.cc/N9TX-VTP6]. The Court, however, does not worry overmuch about the
party presentation principle. See Henry Paul Monaghan, On Avoiding Avoidance, Agenda
Control, and Related Matters, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 665, 689–93 (2012).
463. 141 S. Ct. 1532, 1537 (2021).
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federal court.464 One of the defendants’ eight proffered grounds for removal was that some of their challenged exploration and drilling took
place at the direction of the federal government, and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1442(a)(1) provides for a federal forum for claims against individuals
working under an officer of the United States.465 The district court rejected
all eight grounds for removal and remanded to state court.466 The defendants appealed.467
Ordinarily, remand orders are not reviewable on appeal, but under
the Removal Clariﬁcation Act, those “orders” are appealable if the case
was removed pursuant to section 1442.468 The Fourth Circuit limited its
review of the remand order to the section 1442 grounds and affirmed.469
The Supreme Court granted certiorari.470
Writing for the majority, Justice Neil Gorsuch said that the Fourth
Circuit was wrong.471 In a decision reminiscent of Maryland Casualty,472 the
Court said the lower court erred in only reviewing one of the questions
instead of the entire case.473 Gorsuch took a textualist approach and
looked up “order” in Black’s Law Dictionary, which deﬁnes it as a “written
direction or command delivered by . . . a court or judge.”474 Thus, the
proper scope of appellate review was the direction or command, not just
the answer to the particular section 1442 question.475 The Court seemed
to agree with the petitioner energy companies that Congress knows how
to direct appellate review to particular questions when it wants to.476
The Court’s discussion of judicial obligation is instructive. First, it
notes that federal jurisdiction is generally not optional.477 Because “courts
are obliged to decide cases within the scope of federal jurisdiction,” the

464. Id. at 1536.
465. Id.
466. Mayor of Balt. v. BP P.L.C., 388 F. Supp. 3d 538, 549 (D. Md. 2019).
467. BP P.L.C., 141 S. Ct. at 1537.
468. Removal Clariﬁcation Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-51, § 2, 125 Stat. 545, 545–46
(codiﬁed as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442, 1446–1447 (2018)); BP P.L.C., 141 S. Ct. at 1536.
469. Mayor of Balt. v. BP P.L.C., 952 F.3d 452, 457 (4th Cir. 2020).
470. Mayor of Balt. v. BP P.L.C., 141 S. Ct. 222, 222 (mem.) (2020).
471. BP P.L.C., 141 S. Ct. at 1543.
472. See supra section IV.C.
473. BP P.L.C., 141 S. Ct. at 1543.
474. Id. at 1537, 1537 n.1 (alteration in original) (citing Order, Black’s Law Dictionary
(11th ed. 2019)).
475. Id. at 1538 (“[W]hen a district court[] . . . rejects all of the defendants’ grounds
for removal, § 1447(d) authorizes a court of appeals to review each and every one of them.
After all, the statute allows [them] to examine the whole of a district court’s ‘order,’ not just
some of its parts or pieces.”).
476. Id. at 1539.
477. Id. at 1537.
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district court had to deal with all eight grounds for removal before ordering remand.478 Thus, the order under review encompassed all eight
grounds for removal, not just the section 1442 issue.
Baltimore also offered functionalist arguments. It suggested that limiting review to only the removal grounds mentioned in the statutes would
serve efficiency goals.479 The Court did not bite. It explained that “‘even
the most formidable’ policy arguments cannot ‘overcome’ a clear statutory
directive.”480
Given the Court’s strong endorsement that the “order” is what is reviewed—not merely the question—two questions come to mind. First, how
should we think of the remainder of the statutes that give the Court certiorari jurisdiction over “[f]inal judgments or decrees” of state and territorial courts?481 A ﬁnal judgment is “[a] court’s ﬁnal determination of the
rights and obligations of the parties in a case.”482 It would seem to follow
that the Court’s review of judgments should be no less comprehensive
than a circuit court’s review of an order.
The second question is what to make of the Court’s decision to vacate
the Fourth Circuit court’s order and remand it for further proceedings.483
On a fair reading, the case consisted of eight questions: the eight grounds
for removal.484 The Court was quite clear about this in stating that the
Fourth Circuit was wrong to limit review to the single question. The case—
those eight questions—was before the Court. In an opinion built on the
recognition that an appellate court reviewing a remand order should consider every part of that order, the Court refused to consider any of the
grounds proffered by the petitioners for removal.485 Nor did it give Baltimore the opportunity to defend the judgment below on all grounds available in the record.486 And why not? Because doing so would “not implicate
the circuit split that [the Court] took th[e] case to resolve and [the Court]
believe[d] the wiser course [was] to leave these matters for the Fourth Circuit to resolve in the ﬁrst instance.”487
With this in mind, consider that not only do the statutes tie certiorari
to “cases” emerging from lower federal courts488 but other statutes give the

478. Id. at 1537–38 (quoting Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72 (2013)).
479. Id. at 1542.
480. Id. (quoting Kloeckner v. Solis, 568 U.S. 41, 56 n.4 (2012)).
481. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (2018) (review of state courts).
482. Judgment, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
483. BP P.L.C., 141 S. Ct. at 1543.
484. Id. at 1536.
485. Id. at 1543.
486. Id.
487. Id.
488. See 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (2018). Interestingly, the statute allows for certiorari to bring
the case to the Court even before it is ﬁnal in the lower courts. See James Lindgren &
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Court certiorari power to review “[f]inal judgments or decrees” from the
highest court of each state,489 the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico,490 and
the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands.491 Just as an order encompasses
all of its component parts, so does a judgment or decree include more
than a discrete question. There may be policy reasons to prefer a narrower
review, but that is not what the text says. If orders are orders, should not
decrees be decrees?
*

*

*

The Roberts Court’s rejection of functionalist arguments is perhaps
unsurprising. Textualism—at least in statutory matters—is ascendant.492 In
both Iancu and BP P.L.C., the Court followed text over function. Both the
Director and the lower courts had good reasons to limit review, but the
Court looked to the statute and deferred to Congress, determining that
the language said that the Director and the lower courts had to look at all
of the questions.493 The certiorari statutes seem at least as clear as the statutes involved in these two cases, yet the Court’s functionalist desires appear
to overcome the clear statutory directive.494
Insofar as defenders of question selection would turn to the raw
Article III judicial power, the originalist majority on the Roberts Court
would also have to face up to the history of certiorari and the Court’s
appellate jurisdiction. No originalist account can simply ignore the historical understanding that the power to answer questions is derivative of the
obligation to decide cases.495
And so we ﬁnd ourselves in the following situation. The Roberts Court
holds the American people and the other branches of government to
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century meanings of constitutional language.
William P. Marshall, The Supreme Court’s Extraordinary Power to Grant Certiorari Before
Judgment in the Court of Appeals, 1986 Sup. Ct. Rev. 259, 272–73.
489. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).
490. Id. § 1258.
491. Id. § 1260. The Court can also review “[d]ecisions” from the Court of Appeals for
the Armed Forces. Id. § 1259.
492. As Justice Elena Kagan put it, “We’re all textualists now.” Harvard L. Sch., The
2015 Scalia Lecture: A Dialogue With Justice Elena Kagan on the Reading of Statutes,
YouTube, at 08:29 (Nov. 25, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dpEtszFT0Tg (on
ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
493. See supra notes 438–487 and accompanying text.
494. See supra notes 458–461 and accompanying text; cf. BP P.L.C. v. Mayor of Balt.,
141 S. Ct. 1532, 1537–38 (2021) (employing textualism to determine the meaning of “order” as it applies to authorizing appellate review); SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348,
1355 (2018) (ﬁnding that, despite potential policy reasons for interpreting the statute differently, the statute’s language clearly limits the agency’s power).
495. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“Those who apply the
rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conﬂict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each.”).
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It forces lower courts to focus intensely on statutory text, and the Justices
increasingly clamp down on agencies that broadly interpret their own delegated discretion in ways that contradict congressional intent.496 And yet,
when it comes to certiorari, the Court’s actual practice seems inconsistent
with the statutory text and Congress’s intent as to how the Court should
use its certiorari discretion—to say nothing of the Justices’ own testimony
to Congress in 1925 or 1988. The best reading of the history seems to be
that the modern Court has taken this power for itself. The origin and development of the Court’s practice of limiting grants of certiorari raise serious questions about the legitimacy of the practice that bite particularly
hard under a textualist or originalist methodology.
If the Court holds others—but not itself—to a standard of originalist
and textualist ﬁdelity to history and statutes, how can it expect litigating
parties—or the public—to view its methods as legitimate? On an originalist
or textualist account, the responsibility that Congress imposed on the
Court is seemingly unambiguous. The Court is to decide cases it takes
through certiorari as if on a writ of error—that means deciding the whole
case, not just the questions the Court ﬁnds interesting. If the Court were
to live up to its own methodological commitments in the area of agendasetting, Justices might have to accept more certiﬁed questions, engage
more deeply with individual cases, and forgo opportunities to declare law.
Important, discrete questions might go unanswered longer than before.
Justices might have to work harder, take fewer cases, or write shorter opinions. These are interesting and important normative and policy questions,
but those questions appear to have been decided by the statute.
C.

The Costs of Picking Questions

Part of any functionalist appraisal of question selection would also
have to consider the costs. Such consideration is important not only because it would inform a functionalist analysis but even more so because the
Court is actually picking questions, and the practice has real consequences. This brief section cannot hope to fully explore, much less resolve,
the questions it raises, but it is nonetheless important to put these issues
on the table. They are fundamentally important for our understanding of
and the Court’s exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. But these questions

496. See, e.g., Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2415 (2019) (“[I]f there is only one reasonable construction of a regulation . . . then a court has no business deferring to any other
reading, no matter how much the agency insists it would make more sense.”); Iancu, 138 S.
Ct. at 1355 (“Where a statute’s language carries a plain meaning, the duty of an administrative agency is to follow its commands as written, not to supplant those commands with others
it may prefer. . . . Congress’s choice . . . is a choice neither we nor the agency may disregard.”); Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014) (“EPA’s interpretation is also unreasonable because it would bring about an enormous and
transformative expansion in EPA’s regulatory authority without clear congressional authorization.”).
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have been largely obscured by our collective failure to recognize that the
Court takes questions, not cases.
1. Questions and the Judicial Power. — A ﬁrst-order consideration suggested by the Court’s question-selection power is the extent to which the
judicial power, which extends to cases and controversies, empowers the
Court to review a subset of questions that make up the larger case.497 The
historical account presented above suggests it may not. If question selection is naturally part of the appellate power, it raises the question of why
the Court never used it even when it was overloaded with work in the late
nineteenth century498 or why Justices implicitly denied that the Court possessed such power when testifying in favor of the Judges’ Bill.499 Apart from
the history, there are structural concerns as well.
Courts traditionally must answer a sufficient set of questions to justify
their judgment and can only ignore a question if it could not affect the
outcome.500 This tradition allows some discretion in many instances. Even
on the traditional writ of error, appellate courts have some power to
choose questions. For instance, if there are multiple errors on the record
sufficient to justify reversal, a court can choose which one to consider as
sufficient grounds to reverse.501 Yet this power to choose also coincides
with the right of the respondent to defend the judgment on any other
ground present in the record.502 Traditionally, appellate courts have even
less discretion when affirming, since the appellate court must ensure the
entire record is free of error to affirm.503 An appellate court cannot simply

497. One might ask if question selection does not often lead to advisory opinions. Recall
BP P.L.C. v. Baltimore, 141 S. Ct. 1532 (2021); see also supra section V.B. The case, as the
Court made clear, involved eight questions: the eight grounds on which the defendants removed the case to federal court. See supra text accompanying note 466. The circuit court
answered one of the eight questions. See supra text accompanying note 469. The Supreme
Court answered none of them. See supra text accompanying notes 472–476. Instead, it answered a question that was not part of the case at all: a question that—regardless of how the
Court answered it—could not be sufficient to reverse or to affirm the remand order. See
supra text accompanying notes 472–473. Might one fairly consider such an opinion advisory
insofar as it did not—and could not—actually decide the case?
498. See supra section III.A.
499. See supra section IV.A.
500. See supra text accompanying notes 65–67.
501. It is true that appellate courts, when faced with multiple errors, could choose between them as the sufficient ground to reverse the judgment below. Nonetheless, there are
constraints on even this ability. For instance, the canon of constitutional avoidance and judicial minimalism would seem to counsel avoiding some questions—likely the most interesting and consequential ones—if at all possible.
502. See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215 n.6 (1982) (“Respondent may, of course,
defend the judgment below on any ground which the law and the record permit, provided
the asserted ground would not expand the relief which has been granted.”).
503. See Garland v. Davis, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 131, 143 (1846) (“[I]t is the duty of the
court to give judgment on the whole record, and not merely on the points started by counsel.”).

2022]

SUPREME COURT QUESTION SELECTION

861

assume that, because the answer to one question was correct, all answers
are correct.504 Thus, while it is true that courts have always had some ability
to choose questions on the margin, that power has traditionally been tethered to the obligation to decide cases, which often entailed answering
more questions than the Court would prefer.505
Nonetheless, there are several notable exceptions to the general rule
that courts decide cases. As we have seen, Congress has—at different
times—empowered the Court to consider a limited set of questions in a
case, such as certiﬁed questions,506 jurisdictional questions,507 or federal
questions in state cases.508 Congress itself selected the questions in the latter two instances, limiting the Court’s review to the jurisdictional questions
in the underlying federal litigation and the federal questions in cases
emerging from the states. Question certiﬁcation, on the other hand, does
not include congressional limits on the questions themselves.509 However,
such certiﬁcation leaves both the agenda-setting power and the case itself
in the hands of lower court judges.510 These two conditions clearly distinguish certiﬁcation from question selection in important ways. First, certiﬁcation denies the Court agenda-setting power: The Court can answer
questions but not questions it selects. Thus, certiﬁcation places the Court
in the position of exercising judgment—answering a question it cannot
avoid—rather than will.511 Second, the certiﬁed question is answered while
the entire case is still with the circuit court. Thus, the traditional duty for
the appellate court with jurisdiction over the case to consider the entire
record would not apply to the Supreme Court unless it ordered the lower
court to certify the entire record up to the Justices for review of the entire

504. Again, if the Court could satisfy its duty to decide a case by answering any question
of its choosing, there would have been no need for the Court to turn to Congress for expanded certiorari powers.
505. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) (“It is most true that
this Court will not take jurisdiction if it should not: but it is equally true, that it must take
jurisdiction if it should. . . . Questions may occur which we would gladly avoid; but we cannot
avoid them.”).
506. 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (2018); see also supra Part I.
507. Judiciary Act of 1891, Pub. L. No. 51-517, § 6, 26 Stat. 826, 828; see also supra notes
32–33 and accompanying text.
508. Judiciary Act of 1789, Pub. L. No. 1-20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85–86; see also supra notes
153–156 and accompanying text.
509. See 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2).
510. See id.
511. See The Federalist No. 78, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (“The courts must declare the sense of the law; and if they should be disposed to
exercise WILL instead of JUDGMENT, the consequence would equally be the substitution
of their pleasure to that of the legislative body.”); see also Hartnett, supra note 2, at 1718–
26 (“While the judiciary still lacks its own military force, the Judges’ Bill gave the Supreme
Court an important tool with which to exercise will: The ability to set one’s own agenda is
at the heart of exercising will.”).
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matter in controversy.512 Either way, parties are still before an appellate
court with an independent obligation to decide the case as a whole, not
merely a single question. If the Court grants certiorari to a question after
the circuit court gives its judgment, the case is no longer before that court.
Any review of a discrete question would thus not be part of an actual appellate process evaluating the entire case.513
2. Preselected Questions and Judicial Review. — The Court’s judicial review power is classically rooted in the Court’s duty to decide cases in its
jurisdiction.514 Going back to Marbury, it is the obligation that generates
the power.515 Chief Justice Marshall’s answer to the question of where the
Court gets the power to strike down a statute as unconstitutional is to plead
necessity.516 The Court had to hear and decide the case—it had no
choice—and deciding the case required exercising judicial review.517 Thus,
judicial review is a consequence of the Court’s unavoidable obligation to
decide a case within its jurisdiction. Certiorari poses a problem for this
account. As Professor Edward Hartnett powerfully puts the problem:
A court that can simply refuse to hear a case can no longer credibly say that it had to decide it. If asked, “Why did you exercise
the awesome power to declare an Act of Congress unconstitu-

512. 28 U.S.C. § 1254.
513. A follow-on question would be whether the Court could make a limited grant of
certiorari to target a particular question while litigation was ongoing. To this, some things
are certain and others are speculative. The Court can grant certiorari to cases in the lower
courts. See Lindgren & Marshall, supra note 488, at 259. However, in the statute and historically, certiorari runs to cases not discrete questions. Thus, granting certiorari at such a point
would seem to bring the entire case to the Court. For the Court to target a question while
the case is in a lower court, someone would have to present the question to the Court. If the
lower court judges do, it would be traditional certiﬁcation. Further, there would seem to be
no way for the parties to do so, since they cannot appeal a question, only a judgment.
514. See John Harrison, The Role of the Legislative and Executive Branches in Interpreting the Constitution, 73 Cornell L. Rev. 371, 373 (1988) (“The power to interpret the
Constitution . . . comes from the case-deciding power. To suggest that the power to interpret
is primary and the case deciding power secondary, is to misinterpret the Constitution and
to confuse cause and effect.”); see also United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 20 (1960) (“The
very foundation of the power of the federal courts to declare Acts of Congress unconstitutional lies in the power and duty of those courts to decide cases and controversies properly
before them.”); Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 Harv.
L. Rev 26, 32 (2000) (offering a complementary account of Marshall’s justiﬁcation of judicial review in Marbury).
515. See Steven D. Smith, Courts, Creativity, and the Duty to Decide a Case, 1985 U. Ill.
L. Rev. 573, 580 (“Without the assumption that courts must decide cases within their jurisdiction, Marshall’s argument would collapse; a court could avoid the dilemma described by
Marshall simply by declining to decide the case at all.”); see also Akhil Reed Amar, Marbury,
Section 13, and the Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 443, 449
(1989) (describing judicial review as “the incidental byproduct of applying rules to ‘particular cases’” (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803))).
516. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 178.
517. See id.; see also Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821).
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tional?” the Justices of the Supreme Court can no longer say, “Because we had to.” Instead, they must say, “Because we chose
to.”518
This criticism, however, does not force the conclusion that judicial review is no longer legitimate. It allows for another alternative, albeit an implicit alternative that does not cast the Court in a kind light. It could be
that the Court still has the obligation to decide all of the cases,519 it just
chooses not to. The Court could simply be shirking its duty—worse, strategically shirking to maximize its power—but the duty would remain. Thus,
when the Court does grant certiorari and take a case, it operates out of
obligation and so retains the power of judicial review on the standard account. This alternative, however, is not available in the context of preselected questions since the Court is not actually deciding the case.
Put differently, the classic justiﬁcation for judicial review is a threestep process: (1) The Court has an obligation to decide the case; (2) pursuant to that obligation it decides the case; and (3) deciding the case requires the exercise of judicial review.
Hartnett locates his objection at step one, arguing that the power to
avoid cases implicitly eliminates the obligation.520 The problem presented
by preselected questions appears at step two.521 The Court is not deciding
the case at all. Even if the Court could avoid Hartnett’s objection by admitting its failure to decide all the cases it should decide, that resolution
would not explain how the Court could exercise judicial review if it is not
actually deciding cases.
In sum, question selection raises questions about, indeed perhaps
threatens, the foundations of the Court as an appellate body. It is unclear
that the Court is exercising the Article III judicial power or that it has any
workable justiﬁcation for judicial review. This seems to be quite a price to
pay for some marginal gains in function.522

518. Hartnett, supra note 2, at 1717. Hartnett observed that as of the time of his writing,
there were no works that took up the challenge to “reconcile certiorari with the classic conception of judicial review.” Id. at 1716.
519. Or at least the nonfrivolous claims that relate to federal and constitutional law.
520. Hartnett, supra note 2, at 1717.
521. Hartnett gestures at this problem as well. See id. (“[The] Justices can no longer say
they had to decide the case . . . . To the contrary, they can grant certiorari as to a particular
question in a case, ignoring the presence of other legal errors, even if this means that the
Court affirms a judgment that is, by hypothesis, erroneous.”).
522. For an empirical account of the interesting intersection between certiorari and judicial review, see Benjamin Johnson & Keith E. Whittington, Why Does the Supreme Court
Uphold So Many Laws?, 2018 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1001.
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CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court no longer decides cases. This statement is not
particularly contestable. Its very rules limit consideration to questions presented.523 The Justices regularly add or subtract questions to frame cases
in ways that allow the Justices to make the policy they want to make. This
practice is so commonplace that it has largely escaped notice, to say nothing of close scrutiny. Such an examination is long overdue, and it turns out
that the historical development of the practice is not ﬂattering to the
Court. Question-selection power rests uneasily with text and history.
Once we begin to consider the objective fact that the Court answers
questions instead of deciding cases, many new questions will appear. Is a
cherry-picked question a case or controversy? Is it just for the Court to treat
parties and their litigation as means rather than ends? How can a textualist
Court ignore the text or an originalist Court ignore the history and retain
any legitimacy? More broadly, is there a ceiling on the Court’s agenda control powers or any limit on what the Court can do with its own procedures
and jurisdiction?
These are important questions that remain unasked and unanswered.
But they become urgent and inescapable once we stare at the undeniable
truth that the Court no longer decides cases: It asks and answers questions.
This is an awesome power that gives the Court the ability to choose what
law to declare on its own timetable. And it is a power that the Court seems
to have taken for itself.

523. See Sup. Ct. R. 14.1(a).

